Regulation Through the Looking Glass:  Hospitals, Blue Cross, and Certificate-of-Need by Payton, Sallyanne & Powsner, Rhoda M.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 79 Issue 2 
1980 
Regulation Through the Looking Glass: Hospitals, Blue Cross, and 
Certificate-of-Need 
Sallyanne Payton 
University of Michigan Law School, spayton@umich.edu 
Rhoda M. Powsner 
University of Michigan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, Insurance Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and 
the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sallyanne Payton & Rhoda M. Powsner, Regulation Through the Looking Glass: Hospitals, Blue Cross, and 
Certificate-of-Need, 79 MICH. L. REV. 203 (1980). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol79/iss2/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
REGULATION THROUGH THE LOOKING 
GLASS: HOSPITALS, BLUE CROSS, AND 
CERTIFICATE-OF-NEED 
Sallyanne Payton* 
Rhoda M Powsner** 
This is the story of the forgotten origins of hospital certificate-of-
need regulation. For nearly three decades rising hospital costs have 
perplexed economists and public policy experts. The principal regu-
latory response to rising hospital costs has been government control 
of hospital construction through state planning and licensing regula-
tion, known popularly as "certificate-of-need" (hereinafter some-
times referred to as "CON"). I CON has been promoted by the Blue 
Cross, the voluntary hospitals, and the public health establishment.2 
Hospital costs have continued to rise, however, and nowhere more 
dramatically than in New York, the state that pioneered CON. 
Economists have discovered that some forms of CON regulation 
seem actually to have accelerated the rate of increase in hospital 
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•• Clinical Instructor in Medicine, University of Michigan. B.A. 1949, Adelphi Univer-
sity; M.D. 1953, Yale University; J.D. 1980, University of Michigan. - Ed. 
I. We use the term "certificate-of-need" broadly to mean any exercise of state licensing 
authority with respect to health care facilities or services where the standards for the exercise 
of such authority are described in terms of the "need" for the facilities or services. Since this 
Article deals only with the origins of CON regulation, we shall not attempt to take into ac-
count its present variations. For a comprehensive compilation of state certificate-of-need stat-
utes and federal statutes and regulations bearing on certificate-of-need requirements see 
CHAYET & SONNENREICH, P.C., CERTIFICATE OF NEED: AN EXPANDING REGULATORY CON-
CEPT (1978 & Supp. Fall 1978). 
2. As used in this Article, the terms ''voluntary 'hospital" and ''voluntary nonprofit hospi-
tal" refer to hospitals that are owned by private nonprofit enterprises and into which patients 
enter without legal compulsion. They are to be distinguished from hospitals owned by govern-
ments or for-profit enterprises (including sole proprietorships, partnerships, or business corpo-
rations). All of the hospitals described as ''voluntary" in this Article are short-term general 
hospitals. 
We use the term "establishment" to describe the leadership of the elite voluntary hospitals 
and the public health profession. The elite of the voluntary hospital sector are the administra-
tors, physicians, and governing board members associated with the large voluntary hospitals. 
The leadership of the public health profession includes officials of the United States Public 
Health Service and the leading state departments of health, university faculty members spe-
cializing in public health or hospital administration, and officials of major hospital or health 
planning agencies in either the government or the voluntary sector. Unless otherwise men-
tioned specifically as having a separate interest, the leadership of the Blue Cross is subsumed 
within the elite voluntary hospital establishment (with which it had an overlapping and inter-
locking directorate during the period under discussion). 
203 
204 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:203 
costs. If one believes that planning and regulation of construction 
were intended to stem hospital cost inflation, then one must regard 
CON as a failure. 
But CON was not designed to be a cost containment program. 
CON was invented in the late 1950s when Blue Cross rate increases, 
made necessary by rising hospital costs, provoked public controversy 
in a number of eastern and midwestern states. Insurance commis-
sioners in several states threatened to use their power over Blue 
Cross rates to institute hospital cost containment measures; regional 
planning and hospital construction controls were put forth by the 
hospital and public health establishments as an alternative to cost 
controls. The hospital and public health establishments hoped that 
regional planning with community involvement would help to edu-
cate the public to the increasing quality and expense of good hospital 
care and thereby lead to public acceptance of rising costs; they never 
contemplated that CON would either control costs in individual hos-
pitals or counteract the acknowledged causes of rising costs in the 
hospital sector as a whole. 
Regional planning and hospital construction controls were in-
tended to achieve three related objectives that were shared by the 
Blue Cross, the voluntary hospital establishment, and leading health 
officials in both the public and the private sectors: (1) to restore pub-
lic confidence in the voluntary hospitals and their financing arm, the 
Blue Cross, in order to deflect growing pressure for government reg-
ulation of hospital costs and government-sponsored compulsory 
health insurance; (2) to protect the dominance of the existing large 
voluntary teaching hospitals; and (3) to channel hospital growth in 
the developing suburbs into large, full-service, general hospitals. Al-
though the voluntary hospitals and the public health establishment 
maintained that regional planning enforced through hospital con-
struction controls would help to solve the problem of rising hospital 
costs, it was always clear that regional planning was being promoted 
for its own sake: cost control, if it materialized, would be a by-prod-
uct. It was reasonably· apparent to anyone who cared to think 
clearly, however, that cost control would be a most unlikely by-prod-
uct of this form of regulation. 3 It would be more realistic to expect 
3. One of the most thoughtful members of the health planning profession, Symond R. 
Gottlieb, formerly executive director of the Hospital Areawide Planning Committee of Mil-
waukee, Wis. and now executive director of the Greater Detroit Area Hospital Council, has 
said: . 
Those who think of areawide health planning as a primary mechanism for reducing costs 
are doomed to much disillusionment - planning may redirect the use of some resources 
to permit their more effective use - total costs, however, are likely to increase as the 
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planning to cause hospital costs to rise even more rapidly, since plan-
ning was designed to concentrate the hospital industry into fewer but 
larger and more expensive units delivering increasingly sophisticated 
services to increasing numbers of patients. 
Nonetheless, the proponents of certificate-of-need succeeded in 
persuading nearly all the states and the federal government to adopt 
regional planning and hospital construction controls as a principal 
method of controlling hospital costs. In our review of the legislative 
histories of the New York CON laws and the federal statutes that 
adopted the CON approach, we were surprised to discover that no 
respectable voice within the hospital or public health establishments 
had spoken against regional planning or hospital construction con-
trols on any grounds; no recognized authority in hospital matters, so 
far as we could determine, pointed out that planning and controlling 
construction would tend to concentrate the hospital industry and to 
accelerate the rise in hospital costs. 
Such unanimity is unusual, particularly within an industry as 
heterogeneous as the hospital industry. That the consensus included 
not only the leadership of the hospital industry itself, but also gov-
ernment and university-based public health authorities, suggested to 
us that there must be some hidden explanation. In the biographies 
of the persons principally responsible for promoting regional plan-
ning and CON we found evidence of close informal ties among insti-
tutions that were formally independent of one another. The careers 
of voluntary hospital and public health leaders showed a pattern of 
movement within voluntary hospital management, voluntary hospi-
tal associations, the Blue Cross, and university schools of public 
health, suggesting that these institutions share a common outlook 
and have a common pool of high-level officials. 
The concerted behavior of a large and diverse group of hospital 
and public health officials in promoting regional planning and CON 
cannot be understood, however, as the outcome of the career pat-
terns of a few chief executives. Underlying both the career patterns 
and the unanimous support for regional planning is the fact that the 
voluntary hospital and public health establishments share a common 
ideology. The cornerstone of that ideology is the idea of a planned 
regional health care system with the large teaching hospital at its 
center, and with all other elements of the health care system as satel-
lites. This concept of the health care system was first developed by 
result of good planning as we strive to make comprehensive health care available to larger 
numbers of people. , 
Rosenfeld, Areawide Planning Controls Costs, 46 HOSPITALS, Feb. 1, 1972, at 40. 
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the voluntary hospital establishment. It was legitimized and en-
shrined in federal policy by the original Hill-Burton Act of 1946, 
which was the product of a close collaboration between the Ameri-
can Hospital Association and the United States Public Health Serv-
ice. From that time forward health planners, whether in the public 
or the private sector, have been educated in the belief that the entire 
health care system should be centered on the large teaching hospital. 
A clear focus on the commitment of the public health and hospi-
tal establishments to the large teaching hospital and their belief in 
rationalizing the health care system through community-based plan-
ning allows us to understand the ideas and institutions that have pro-
duced our present system of hospital regulation. It can also help us 
to understand the structure and behavior of the hospital industry and 
can illuminate current controversies over health care policy. 
What follows is a narrative account of the development of re-
gional planning and certificate-of-need legislation. As part of that 
story, we trace the evolution of the Blue Cross, explain its central 
role in the voluntary hospital and health insurance industries, and 
show how the voluntary hospital and public health establishments 
came to its rescue in the controversy over rising Blue Cross rates in 
the late 1950s. We off er a brief summary of our findings at the outset 
to make the Article more accessible to the general reader; at the close 
of the text we discuss Roemer's Law, the economic theory used to 
justify CON legislation, and the system of voluntary sector self regu-
lation that CON complements. 
I. SUMMARY: THE FORGOTTEN ORIGINS OF REGIONAL 
PLANNING AND CERTIFICATE-OF-NEED 
Certificate-of-need regulation was invented in the late 1950s, at a 
time when the voluntary hospitals and the Blue Cross were under 
attack on a variety of fronts: several state insurance commissioners 
and legislatures, stimulated by public concern over rising Blue Cross 
rates, were threatening to hold down hospital costs by regulating 
Blue Cross rates and reimbursement policies; the cost of health care 
for the aged had pushed compulsory government health insurance, 
or "socialized medicine," as its opponents called it, back onto the 
national agenda; and the Blue Cross was losing ground to the com-
mercial insurance companies, which had begun to off er health and 
hospitalization insurance. At the same time, the explosive growth of 
metropolitan areas and the spread of health insurance were stimulat-
ing new hospital construction both by voluntary hospitals and, more 
ominously from the point of view of the hospital and public health 
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establishments, by proprietary hospitals. Many of these new hospi-
tals were small, and the smallest proprietaries functioned as exten-
sions of physicians' offices. The proliferation of hospitals was of 
great concern, not only to the existing hospitals, but also to the 
United States Public Health Service and state hospital planning 
agencies, to whom the federal Hill-Burton Act had given responsibil-
ity for planning coordinated regionalized hospital networks. 
Uncoordinated growth threatened to create many small and me-
dium-sized institutions; the public health planners preferred to de-
velop the hospital system around the few large teaching hospitals 
that were the centers of elite, scientifically sophisticated, medical 
practice. At the very time when advancing technology was enhanc-
ing the role of large teaching hospitals in medical research and edu-
cation, middle-class population and private resources were migrating 
away from the core cities, in which most of the elite hospitals were 
located. Preserving these institutions and maintaining the concept of 
regional centralization of resources, to which the health planners 
were committed, required that small hospital development be stifled 
and that construction of adequately sized hospitals in the growing 
suburban areas (which was inevitable) be controlled. Otherwise, un-
necessary competition for patients and resources would injure the 
core institutions. Officials thought they could meet their objectives 
both by preventing the construction of hospitals that failed to con-
form to a regional plan and by encouraging the hospitals within a 
region to use their facilities efficiently through collective action 
under the sponsorship of regional planning agencies. The public 
health planning establishment thus collaborated with the voluntary 
hospitals in presenting to the public the idea of regional planning 
and controls on hospital construction as the cornerstone of public 
policy toward hospitals. They also agreed that the public desired 
high-quality care and would accept rising costs if the hospitals could 
demonstrate that they were serving community needs and were man-
aged efficiently. 
It was the Blue Cross financial crisis, however, that stimulated 
adoption of the first state certificate-of-need legislation. As hospital 
costs rose in the 1950s, health insurance costs rose with them. In the 
major eastern and midwestern states where Blue Cross dominated 
the health insurance market, rising hospital costs translated directly 
into rising Blue Cross rates. By the late 1950s the major Blue Cross 
plans were forced almost annually to ask state insurance commis-
sioners for large rate increases, generating political controversy over 
whether the close relationship between the Blue Cross and the hospi-
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tals was preventing the Blue Cross from protecting the interests of its 
subscribers. Some state insurance commissioners and legislatures 
threatened to use their authority over Blue Cross rates and reim-
bursement policies to control hospital costs, and through cost control 
to influence the nature of hospital-based medical care. There was 
also considerable political interest in amending Blue Cross enabling 
statutes to require broader community and subscriber representation 
on Blue Cross plan governing boards. 
The Blue Cross was anxious to avoid further embroilment with 
the insurance commissioners and to restore public confidence in it-
self and in the voluntary hospitals. Its own survival as an organiza-
tion depended on its ability to keep hospital care affordable for the 
broad middle group of citizens; however, its symbiosis with the hos-
pitals disabled it from engaging in arm's-length bargaining with 
them over costs, and Blue Cross leaders shared the hospitals' belief 
that containing costs would compromise the quality of care. 
Some entire cost centers could be eliminated, however, without 
compromising elite hospital values: if the Blue Cross could rid itself 
of responsibility for reimbursing small hospitals, and if the voluntary 
hospital establishment would discipline itself to build new facilities 
only if they were actually necessary, then the community's total hos-
pital bill as reflected in Blue Cross rates could be justified by the 
standards of elite medical practice and by community need. With 
this in mind, the Blue Cross became a primary proponent of regional 
planning and hospital construction controls. Of course, eliminating 
smaller hospitals did not mean that there would be actual savings to 
the Blue Cross; eliminating smaller hospitals would only provide 
space for larger and more expensive hospitals to grow. Hospital 
costs and therefore Blue Cross rates could be expected to increase 
even more rapidly if all institutions conformed to elite standards. 
The function of the CON program from the Blue Cross perspective 
was to legitimize these trends and to avoid criticism of itself and the 
hospitals based on uninformed allegations of waste. 
The leaders of the voluntary hospital establishment were anxious 
to preserve the legitimacy of the Blue Cross. The Blue Cross and the 
system of private health insurance that it anchored were the hospi-
tals' bulwark against government-sponsored health insurance, which 
would end the institutional autonomy of the voluntary hospitals and 
erode the quality of elite medical practice and teaching by equalizing 
resources among many different types of institutions. Federal health 
insurance for the aged and the poor was already becoming politically 
achievable, largely as a result of rising hospital costs; a general loss 
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of faith in the voluntary health insurance system could tum into a 
political stampede toward compulsory government health insurance. 
The Blue Cross and the hospitals thus pulled together in the crisis of 
the late 1950s as it became clear that voluntary hospitals and volun-
tary health insurance would survive or perish together. 
Regional planning and hospital construction controls had origi-
nally been invented by the voluntary hospital establishment to guide 
private fundraising activities at a time when hospitals were still pri-
marily charitable institutions. By the 1950s, however, the spread of 
health insurance had produced a strong consumer demand for serv-
ices over a wide range of quality and rich incentives for entry into 
the hospital industry. The program of regional planning and con-
struction controls that the hospital and public health establishments 
wished to enforce amounted to a cartel dedicated to controlling entry 
and maintaining standards. The most desirable cartel manager from 
the point of view of the hospitals was the Blue Cross, which could 
use its market power to restrain entry by unwanted new hospitals 
and to set minimum standards in states where it was the dominant 
health insurer. One of the first states to undertake the program was 
Michigan, where the Blue Cross was dominant in the health insur-
ance market and had strong support from business and labor. In 
collaboration with the voluntary hospitals and the public health es-
tablishment, the Michigan Blue Cross in 1960 began refusing reim-
bursement for the capital costs of new hospitals whose construction 
could not be justified by public need and setting minimum standards 
for hospitals seeking Blue Cross participating status. State govern-
ment agencies endorsed the closing of existing small hospitals and 
agreed that no additional ones would be built. 
As the hospital and public health establishments promoted re-
gional planning and hospital construction controls throughout the 
1960s, these programs came to be identified with the objective of 
controlling hospital costs, on the theory that a properly coordinated 
hospital system would eliminate unnecessary hospital beds and un-
necessary duplication of services, equipment, and facilities. The em-
phasis on planning and construction controls as a potential method 
of cost control became pronounced when the voluntary hospitals and 
the public health establishments, unable to use the Blue Cross as the 
cartel manager, were forced to tum to the government for assistance 
in controlling hospital expansion. 
New York was the first state to adopt legislation requiring 
mandatory regional planning and certification-of-need for construc-
tion of hospital facilities. In New York, as in other states with large 
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Blue Cross plans, escalating hospital costs had forced the Blue Cross 
to seek frequent and large rate increases, giving rise to public contro-
versy over the viability and legitimacy of the Blue Cross. Center city 
resources were draining away toward the suburbs, particularly in the 
New York City metropolitan area, creating financial difficulties for 
the city's large voluntary hospitals, which were some of the finest in 
the nation. Operating in a far more heterogeneous and contentious 
environment than did the Michigan Blue Cross, however, the eight 
Blue Cross plans in New York State could not control hospital con-
struction solely through their own market power; they needed to en-
list the licensing power of the state government, which had its own 
interest in preserving the voluntary hospitals of New York City. 
New York's certificate-of-need legislation, adopted in 1964, was 
intended to be friendly regulation: it had originally been proposed 
by the public health and voluntary hospital establishments; the state 
regulatory agencies that gained licensing power under the legislation 
were expected to concur in the recommendations of regional plan-
ning agencies whose memberships were to consist mainly of repre-
sentatives of hospitals, medical societies, and public health interests, 
with some participation by business, labor, and local government. 
The role of state authority was to put "teeth" into the decisions of 
those agencies, which were designed to carry on the tradition of vol-
untary sector self-governance. 
The New York City Blue Cross was a major proponent of 
mandatory planning and CON. It insisted with increasing urgency 
that the legislation was needed to keep Blue Cross rates down. Since 
CON was presented as a solution to the problem of rising Blue Cross 
rates, it was also characterized politically as a solution to the prob-
lem of rising hospital costs: public concern had centered on the 
threat of uncontrollably rising costs, and any "solutions" involving 
the exercise of public authority had to be described as methods of 
warding off that threat. 
The tenuousness of the linkage between certificate-of-need and 
cost control was never brought to public attention. All of the experts 
on hospital matters supported CON while earlier proposals for more 
definitive forms of cost containment withered. The New York State 
Insurance Commissioner, like his counterparts in other states, had 
threatened to control hospital costs by regulating Blue Cross reim-
bursement policy; that suggestion was buried in the unanimity of 
opinion among hospital experts that state supervision of hospitals 
should be lodged primarily in the state health department, which 
was part of the public health establishment. Passage of CON legisla-
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tion had the practical effect of transferring principal responsibility 
for protecting the public interest in affordable hospital care from the 
cost-conscious insurance commissioner to public health officials who 
shared the hospitals' belief in the primacy of quality. Neither the 
Blue Cross nor the hospitals nor the public health officials them-
selves in New York had an interest in dispelling the impression that 
CON would help to control costs, if creating that impression was 
necessary to advance the program with the legislature. The misun-
derstandings created by the Blue Cross's urgent exhortations thus 
went uncorrected. 
This unanimity among hospitals and public health experts is cen-
tral to an understanding of why regional planning and CON was 
later adopted without significant inquiry by numerous state govern-
ments and promoted by the federal government as a primary re-
sponse to rising costs. The voluntary hospitals, the public health 
establishments, and the Blue Cross had a virtual monopoly on credi-
ble discourse about hospital matters during the 1950s and 1960s. 
They stood for the public interest, nonprofit status, community serv-
ice, and quality medical practice. The interests opposed to regional 
planning and CON, by contrast, were principally medical societies 
representing physicians in private practice and, worse, the small hos-
pitals, many of them either unaccredited or proprietary or both. 
They could be thought to represent medical mediocrity, private ad-
vantage, and even greed, and their opposition to regionalization 
could be characterized as a selfish refusal to participate in responsi-
ble collective self-government in the service of their communities. 
Their point of view was also politically unfashionable: they ad-
vocated free competition in the medical marketplace and the auton-
omy of the individual physician at a time when the dominant current 
of public policy was running the other way. Regionalized health 
planning was only one of a number of contemporary commitments 
to greater discipline in the use of public resources. Regional plan-
ning for land use, sewage treatment, schools, housing, and transpor-
tation was being undertaken in order to counteract urban sprawl. 
Large size was considered a positive attribute in institutions, and_ it 
still connoted efficient centralization of resources. Medical free en-
terprise did not make many converts in this environment. 
Advocates of regional hospital planning and certificate-of-need 
had another great advantage over critics: they presented a compre-
hensive idea about the teaching and practice of medicine and the 
organization of health care resources. Critics, by contrast, never de-
veloped an alternative model of medical services organization that 
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might make noncentralized, competitive health care seem to serve 
the public interest. Competition itself was not a plausible value be-
cause the medical marketplace was regarded as a conspicuous exam-
ple of market failure. Community-based planning with citizen 
participation appealed to the general enthusiasm for citizen involve-
ment that marked many programs developed in the 1960s. Finally, 
regional planning and CON regulation represented an attractive so-
lution to public officials' need to "do something" about political con-
troversy over hospital costs, even though the program promised to 
contain the controversy rather than the costs. 
Government regulation of hospital costs was not obviously pref-
erable to CON and in any event would have been fought bitterly by 
the voluntary hospital establishment, forcing politicians into con-
frontations with local community leaders who served on the gov-
erning boards of the voluntary hospitals. CON had the advantage of 
being an expression of support for the voluntary hospitals rather 
than an attempt to subjugate them. It preserved the traditional divi-
sion of responsibility between the public and the voluntary sectors in 
health care matters. It also held out the hope that the voluntary hos-
pitals and the Blue Cross, with only a little bit of help from the gov-
ernment, could keep the health care industry respectable, contain 
controversy over costs, and forestall demands for more challenging 
forms of government action. Certificate-of-need was thus a conve-
nient political response to a problem that had no clearly right an-
swer. 
From the point of view of the voluntary hospital establishment, 
however, CON represented a loss of autonomy, however modest, 
and a compromise with demands for even greater government inter-
vention. It was an essentially defensive program. Experience under 
the New York CON process demonstrated, however, that govern-
ment regulation, if unavoidable, could be designed to reinforce and 
legitimize elite voluntary hospital decisionmaking. 
Four years elapsed between passage of the New York legislation 
and enactment of the next state CON law. During that time the vol-
untary hospital and public health establishments continued to col-
laborate in promoting regional health planning, which by the mid-
1960s was intended to encompass comprehensive planning for serv-
ices as well as facilities. Meanwhile, passage of federal Medicare 
and Medicaid legislation in 1965 had made governments at all levels 
major purchasers of health care services; escalating hospital costs 
precipitated a near crisis in public finance. It was clear that if the 
hospitals did not regulate themselves, governments were prepared to 
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step in. Voluntary hospitals and public health officials again looked 
to state-enforced mandatory regional planning and hospital con-
struction controls as a way of avoiding direct government action to 
control costs. 
This was the atmosphere in which CON legislation proliferated. 
Between 1969 and 1972, twenty states adopted various forms of 
CON regulation, typically at the urging of the voluntary hospitals, 
the public health establishment, and the Blue Cross, and always on 
the premise that it would help to cont~in costs. In 1972 the federal 
government began to allow states to refuse Medicare and Medicaid 
reimbursement to hospitals for the capital costs of new construction 
that had not been certified as required by the public need. In the 
Health Resources Planning and Development Act of 1974, the fed-
eral government required that states adopt CON legislation as a con-
dition of the receipt of certain federal grants. Federal promotion of 
CON complemented the regional health planning movement that it 
had fostered throughout the 1960s, because state legislation could 
assign CON functions to already existing comprehensive health 
planning agencies. 
These developments occurred before the consequences of CON 
regulation were understood. When economists in the mid-1970s in-
vestigated the consequences of early CON legislation they discov-
ered that enactment of the program had either no effect on cost 
trends or a slightly adverse influence by accelerating the trend to-
ward fewer but larger, more capital-intensive, and therefore more 
expensive hospitals. The planning agencies themselves displayed 
characteristics often noticed in other regulatory agencies that control 
entry into an industry by potential competitors: they tended to dis-
courage construction of new hospitals in favor of allowing expansion 
of existing ones, to allow the "planning process" to deteriorate into 
political bargaining, to maintain close ties with the hospital associa-
tions, and generally to behave in ways that have given rise to the 
notion of regulatory agency "capture." 
Once the mythologies of cost control are laid aside, however, it 
becomes clear that this is exactly what was intended. Regional plan-
ning was intended to be an act of collective self-governance among 
largely autonomous institutions; certificate-of-need was intended to 
promote regional concentration of hospital resources and to ensure 
that all facilities met high standards. These central objectives have 
been largely achieved. Indeed, the entire joint effort of the public 
health and voluntary hospital establishment, beginning with their 
collaboration in enacting the Hill-Burton Act of 1946, must be seen 
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as a public policy with remarkable intellectual consistency and polit-
ical durability. The idea that everyone should have access in time of 
need to necessary medical resources without constraints based on in-
dividual ability to pay is linked powerfully to the idea of equal citi-
zenship; belief in scientific and technological progress continues to 
be the cornerstone of faith in modem medicine; and trust in elite 
hospital and medical institutions, while eroding, is quite high. The 
present institutional structure has served its principal purposes and 
has been broadly consonant with the values of the times during 
which it has developed; as ideas about what constitutes quality medi-
cal care and the role of the hospital as an institution change over 
time, perhaps an equally coherent, though different, constellation of 
public values will emerge. 
II. SYMBIOSIS AND AMBIVALENCE: THE BLUE CROSS 
AND THE HOSPITALS 
The modem hospital system is founded on voluntary prepayment 
of hospital costs through private health insurance. Voluntary health 
insurance has made it possible for American society to move sub-
stantially toward realizing its two major aspirations with respect to 
medical care: (1) that every person should have access in time of 
need to high quality medical care without barriers based on individ-
ual ability to pay; and (2) that all care should be based on the most 
advanced scientific methods of treatment as determined by univer-
sity medical schools and teaching hospitals. Health insurance has 
fueled and financed the reciprocal demands of physicians for fine 
hospitals and of hospital administrators for institutional prestige in 
the form of medical school affiliations and medical staffs dominated 
by specialists. The availability of sophisticated hospital practice fa-
cilities in tum has made it feasible for medical schools, with the ac-
tive support of private foundations and the federal govemment,4 to 
4. Private philanthropy dominated medical education and research until 1940. Following 
publication of the Flexner Report in 1910 the General Education Board, one of the Rockefel-
ler organizations, actively promoted the conversion of medical training into university-based 
scientific medical education with fulltime faculty and close relationships with academic science 
departments. The Rockefeller group of organizations and other private foundations estab-
lished research laboratories, made endowment grants to medical schools and schools of public 
health, provided training for research through individual fellowships and institutional grants, 
and aided specific research projects. See Rosen, Patterns of Health Research in the United 
Stales, 1900-1960, 39 BULL. HIST. MED. 201, 212-16 (1965); R. FOSDICK, ADVENTURE IN GIV· 
ING 140-87 (1962). Private philanthropy was also the principal source of capital for hospital 
construction until the mid-1960s. The federal government became dominant in health re-
search and education funding after World War II, principally through the Public Health Serv-
ice and the National Institutes of Health. These agencies stressed biomedical research and 
generally strengthened the relationships between science and medicine. By 1973, governments 
at all levels were outspending private philanthropy in medical research and health facility 
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promote scientific training and research and to train young physi-
cians for careers as specialists. 
The Blue Cross laid the groundwork for these developments: it 
pioneered voluntary health insurance, which has provided a stable 
source of revenue for the hospitals, and it has made health insurance 
protection available to a broad middle range of citizens, thereby 
averting compulsory, universal, government health insurance. The 
origins of the Blue Cross lie, however, not in aspiration but in 
desperation. The Blue Cross, like so many other systems of social 
insurance, was a response to the strains and opportunities created by 
the Depression. 
As it entered the Depression, the voluntary hospital system was 
principally a creation of the 1920s, which had seen a flowering of 
charitable giving as the wealthy aemonstrated their civic responsibil-
ity by endowing civic and cultural enterprises. Between 1921 and 
1931 hospital bed capacity, funded primarily by private philan-
thropy, increased by fifty-five percent.5 Prosperity revealed, how-
ever, the inherent instability of hospital finances. Increases in 
hospital capacity only increased the magnitude of the task of raising 
operating funds, which had to be recovered through a combination 
of patient fees and annual charitable solicitations. 6 The cost of hos-
pital care was beyond the reach of many citizens; occupancy rates in 
the expanded hospital system began to decline. By 1928 occupancy 
of the voluntary hospitals in New York City had dropped to fifty 
percent while the public hospitals, to which patients could go for 
charity care, had filled to capacity.7 
The advent of the Depression threatened to sink the voluntary 
hospital sector altogether as private philanthropy dried up and per-
sonal incomes fell. As early as 1930 some voluntary hospitals in 
construction by a ratio of almost three to one. See generally Terenzio, A Survey of the History 
and Current Outlook of Philanthropy as a Source of Capital for the Needs of the Health Care 
Field, in HEALTH CARE CAPITAL: COMPETITION AND CONTROL 239 (G. MacLeod & M. Perl-
man eds. 1978). The characteristics of medical schools and medical school graduates have 
been influenced heavily by the preferences of the philanthropic and government sectors for 
scientifically trained specialists. See Hall & Lindsay, Medical Schools: Producers of What? 
Sellers lo Whom?, 23 J. LAW & ECON. 55 (1980); Rosen, supra at 201, 212-16; Swain, The Rise 
of a Research Emplre: NIH, 1930-1950, 138 SCIENCE 1233-37 (1962); Blendon, The Changing 
Role of Philanthropy in Health Affairs, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 946 (1975); Drew, The Health 
Syndicate, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1967, at 75-82. 
5. BLUE CROSS COMMISSION, THE HISTORY OF BLUE CROSS 1929-1955, at 2 (undated; 
evidence suggests preparation in 1955-1956). 
6. For a contemporary discussion of this dynamic see Vladeck, Why Non-Profits Go Broke, 
Pue. INTEREST, Winter 1976, at 86. 
7. See BLUE CROSS COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 2-3. 
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New York were on the verge of closing their doors;8 occupancy rates 
and income were low in voluntary hospitals all around the country. 
The problem was that patients could not afford the cost of illnesses 
when they occurred; the solution was prepayment in small install-
• ments, and it was discovered not in New York City, the traditional 
center of leadership in hospital matters, but at Baylor University in 
Dallas, Texas. 
The father of hospitalization insurance was Justin F. Kimball, 
who in 1929 was serving as the executive vice-president of Baylor 
University and was in charge of the Dallas medical units of the uni-
versity. Dr. Kimball had been superintendant of the Dallas public 
schools during the influenza epidemic of 1918-1919. During that ep-
idemic teachers who fell too ill to work were reduced to half pay for 
two weeks and then dropped from the payroll. Thinking this system 
unduly harsh, Dr. Kimball devised a scheme, called the Sick Bene.fit 
Fund, under which each teacher might contribute one dollar per 
month into a common fµnd in exchange for a right to draw six dol-
lars income for each day's absence from work due to illness.9 
Dr. Kimball went to Baylor University in 1929. As he watched 
the :financial troubles of the university hospital deepen, he discov-
ered that many unpaid bills belonged to teachers covered by the Sick 
Bene.fit Fund. 10 Building on the design of the Fund, he offered the 
teachers an additional plan for hospitalization, under which they 
would receive a guarantee of up to twenty-one days of hospital care 
and a one-third discount on the next 344 days (except in times of 
epidemic) in return for a prepayment of fifty cents per month. The 
plan was adopted immediately by the teachers, then by other em-
ployee groups in the Dallas area. It was hailed as a great success. 11 
During the next decade hospitalization plans modeled on the 
Baylor Plan were adopted around the country under the symbol of 
the Blue Cross. It is worth pausing, therefore, to examine more 
closely the principal features of the Baylor Plan, which set the pat-
tern that has endured for over half a century. The plan was nar-
rowly focused on two objectives: (1) to increase the flow and 
reliability of hospital revenues; and (2) to increase the teachers' abil-
ity to use and pay for hospital services in time of need, which in 1929 
meant in time of serious illness. It did not finance services provided 
by other health care institutions or individual professionals, includ-
8. See J. HIRSH, SATURDAY, SUNDAY AND EVERYDAY 54 (1954). 
9. See BLUE CROSS COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 5-6. 
10. See R. EILERS, REGULATION OF BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD PLANS 10 (1963), 
11. See BLUE CROSS COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 6-8. 
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ing physicians, unless their services were part of the basic hospital 
charge. 12 The plan was based on the traditional notion that high-
quality medical care should be available without financial barrier 
when needed, and thus featured no deductible or coinsurance and no 
waiting period before benefits would commence. Its shallow cover-
age (twenty-one days) was designed to deal with ordinary, not ex-
traordinary, requirements for hospitalization. 
The premium was set by contract between the hospital and the 
teachers' association; it reflected both the infant status of hospital 
cost accounting and the fundamental ambivalence that has plagued 
the Blue Cross in its efforts to protect the interests of both its sub-
scribers and the hospitals. In reviewing the books of the Sick Benefit 
Fund, Dr. Kimball had discovered that school teachers had been 
paying, on the average, only about fifteen cents per month for hospi-
tal bills. "And I figured they had used at least twice as much hospi-
talization as they paid for, so to make it safe, I made a tentative fee 
of fifty cents a month" ( emphasis supplied). 13 Even with the appar-
ently generous margin provided by Dr. Kimball's calculations, the 
difficulty of predicting hospital utilization and cost appeared imme-
diately: the plan showed a $900 loss on 1500 members after its first 
year of operation. 14 It was nonetheless hailed as a success, and the 
plan was immediately copied by two other hospitals operating in the 
Dallas area. 
Although Dr. Kimball's plan at Baylor was the first to employ 
hospital prepayment, the idea itself had occurred more or less simul-
taneously to a number of people who were struggling with problems 
of hospital financing. The central actor in what was to become the 
Blue Cross movement was C. Rufus Rorem of the Julius Rosenwald 
Fund, a Chicago charitable foundation that made a practice of giv-
ing grants for self-help projects. Dr. Rorem had been an assistant 
professor of accounting at the University of Chicago Business School 
and had studied capital formation in the hospital sector. His work 
led him to the question of hospital prepayment. 15 
Dr. Rorem viewed hospital prepayment plans principally as a 
way of solving the problems of patients, not of the hospitals them-
selves. Hospital prepayment promised to insulate people against the 
12. Dr. Kimball did not consult the medical staff of the unviersity hospital before placing 
the plan in effect. 
13. See BLUE CROSS COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 7. 
14. See id. at 8. 
15. Unless otherwise indicated, information concerning the development of the Blue Cross 
plans in the 1930s is based primarily on 0. ANDERSON, BLUE CROSS SINCE 1929: ACCOUNTA-
BILITY AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 29-44 (1975). 
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rising and unpredictable costs of care. By eliminating conflict be-
tween hospitals and patients at the time of payment for services, it 
also promised to promote community confidence in hospitals. 
Rorem began to promote the idea of prepayment through both pub-
lished articles and personal contacts within the American Hospital 
Association, whose Committee on Uniform Hospital Accounting he 
chaired in the early 1930s. The Baylor Plan quickly attracted the 
attention of Dr. Rorem, who arranged to have it discussed at the 
1931 AHA convention. 
In 1932, Frank Van Dyk, the Executive Secretary of the Hospital 
Council of Essex County, New Jersey, was faced with a mountain of 
uncollectible accounts at the seventeen hospitals in· Essex County. 
He remembered having heard something about prepayment at the 
1931 convention, and he went to Dallas to see if he could learn 
something from the Baylor Plan. Van Dyk was impressed with the 
prepayment idea. In addition, he saw his own organization as the 
vehicle for avoiding the potential problem of multiple plans, which 
were inconvenient for patients whose preferred physicians did not 
have admitting privileges at the hospitals to whose plans the patients 
belonged. Van Dyk developed the idea for a single plan sponsored 
by his hospital council on behalf of all seventeen hospitals. He first 
approached private commercial insurers to see if they could provide 
the service; they responded that health insurance would be too risky 
because of the lack of actuarial/statistical information on hospital 
utilization. The hospitals were thus forced to create their own sys-
tem: the Essex County Hospital Council issued its first contract in 
January 1933, with rates of ten dollars per year for twenty-one days 
of hospital care ( excluding maternity care ). 16 
The Essex County plan added the critical element of county-wide 
participation by all hospitals to the basic insurance design estab-
lished by Baylor, which it otherwise copied virtually in its entirety. 
The Essex County plan thus pointed the way for a regional approach 
to hospital insurance, reinforcing the newly established pattern of 
hospital cooperation through regional and local hospital councils. 
These councils, which engaged principally in trade association activ-
ities, were by the 1930s already becoming the forum for joint and 
collective action on the part of member hospitals. 17 They were to 
become the institutional parents of the Blue Cross plans. 
Following the regionalized model developed in Essex County, a 
16. See id. at 34-35; BLUE CROSS COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 8-11. 
17. See, e.g., GREATER CLEVELAND HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, A HISTORY OF THE 
GREATER CLEVELAND HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION 1916-1917 (1976). 
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number of local plans were created in scattered parts of the country. 
The name and symbol of the Blue Cross were developed in 1934 by 
the founder of the St. Paul, Minnesota plan, who offered it to Dr. 
Rorem for national use. 18 By 1935 the hospital service benefit plans 
had a standard program design and organizational format, an attrac-
tive symbol, and nearly a q!larter of a million subscribers in fifty 
cities. Its supporters called themselves the Blue Cross movement. 
Blue Cross was clearly an idea whose time had come. It was a 
community-based scheme for a form of social insurance that virtu-
ally everyone agreed was beneficial, developing at a time when even 
compulsory government income security measures were gaining 
popular support. It was consistent with the tradition of voluntary 
community self-help. Moreover, the Blue Cross idea was eminently 
portable. It required only a willing hospital and a willing group of 
subscribers. Because the plans covered only hospital charges, the 
hospitals did not need the consent of other providers (such as physi-
cians, who bill separately even for services rendered within a hospi-
tal) to set up the program. That Blue Cross could be controlled by 
the hospitals themselves allayed fears about oversight and interven-
tion by outsiders. Finally, the Blue Cross idea took hold during the 
bleakest days of the Depression, when hospital administrators and 
trustees were willing to try almost any technique that might keep 
them above water, even though to some of them Blue Cross looked 
like private socialism. 
Notwithstanding the ripeness of the Blue Cross idea, events 
might have taken quite a different turn without the inspired leader-
ship of a few people, particularly Dr. Rorem. Originally, the hospi-
tals themselves were not enthusiastic about the prepaid insurance 
idea; they had to be shown that collecting only pennies a day from 
thousands of people could in fact solve their financial problems. The 
challenge for Dr. Rorem and his pioneering colleagues was to make 
the successes of the early experiments known widely and to provide 
assistance to various communities in organizing hospital service 
plans. In 1934, at the urging of Dr. Rorem, the board of trustees of 
the American Hospital Association_ formally "encouraged" the de-
velopment of nonprofit hospital service organizations and set "stan-
dards" that ratified the most attractive, public-service features of the 
plans already in existence.19 
18. See 0. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at 35-36; BLUE CROSS COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 
12-15. 
19. The standards are set out in full in Rorem, Enabling Legislation for Non-Profit Hospital 
Plans, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 528, 543-44 (1939). 
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Meanwhile, however, the growth of multi-hospital plans had 
generated an important legal issue in several states: did the hospital 
service plans constitute the business of insurance within the meaning 
of existing state regulatory statutes? When groups of hospitals in 
New York and Ohio attempted to organize plans in 1933, they were 
advised by state authorities that they would have to create either a 
stock or a mutual insurance company. The hospitals were not in a 
position to raise money to meet the capital requirements imposed on 
insurance companies; moreover, those requirements were inappro-
priate for the hospital service plans, which offered their subscribers 
service guarantees by the hospitals themselves rather than cash in-
demnification from a common fund. In any event, the selling of in-
surance is widely regarded as a commercial activity, and the 
hospitals were committed to the symbolism of nonprofit status. The 
hospital service plans thus needed to be exempted from the insur-
ance laws and recognized as distinct legal entities. By this time Dr. 
Rorem was already promoting the idea of special enabling legisla-
tion for the plans. In New York, the leaders of hospital, medical, 
and lay groups fostered the passage of the first enabling act, which 
set the pattern for the nation. 
Under the 1934 New York act,20 nonprofit hospital service as-
sociations were allowed to organize with the approval of both the 
Insurance and Welfare Departments of the state. Members of the 
boards of directors were required to be representatives of the con-
tracting hospitals. The plans were exempted from most of the insur-
ance laws; however, they were subject to the rate approval, reporting, 
and examination requirements that applied to commercial insurance 
companies. In addition, the Superintendent of Insurance had au-
thority to review rates of reimbursement to the contracting hospitals. 
The plans were exempted from all state and local taxes except those 
on real and personal property. 
The New York enabling act was followed quickly by similar leg-
islation in California (1934), Illinois (1935), and Pennsylvania 
(1937). The statutes set into state law the most prominent features of 
the hospital service plans: they were authorized to insure against 
- only the costs of hospitalization, and they were to be controlled by 
the hospitals themselves. The enabling acts expressed official state 
approval of hospital control of the plans and confirmed the hospitals' 
representations to the public that the plans were special community-
based organizations, not commercial insurance companies. Blue 
20. 1934 N.Y. Laws, c. 595 (current version, including 1939 amendment, at N.Y. INs. LAW 
§§ 250-60 (McKinney 1980)). See also Rorem, supra note 19. 
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Cross was designed for social service, not for profit. State legislation 
gave the hospital service plans symbolic reinforcement and their own 
legal space in which to grow.21 
The growth was spectacular. The Associated Hospital Service of 
New York, with ninety-three hospitals participating, enrolled its first 
members in May 1935; within a year it was serving 210,000 members 
and paying a half million dollars per year to the hospitals. By 1938 it 
had become a "stabilizing force in the matter of hospital income."22 
It quickly established itself as the largest of the hospital service plans 
and became a pacesetter in developing standards and policy. 
At the same time that the Blue Cross movement was gaining mo-
mentum in the early 1930s, the Roosevelt Administration was at-
tempting to include a national health insurance component in the 
Social Security Act.23 That effort failed in the face of strong opposi-
tion by organized medicine; however, some form of protection 
against the economic hazards of major illness was demanded by a 
public that was growing accustomed to the idea of social insurance. 
As the prospect of compulsory national health insurance receded, it 
became apparent that Blue Cross plans offered the only feasible 
means of providing hospital insurance to the majority of the Ameri-
can people. Dr. Rorem began to think in terms of a national organi-
zation and a national system. The Rosenwald Fund, however, with 
which Dr. Rorem was still affiliated, was terminating its activities in 
the medical field. The Fund gave Dr. Rorem custody of $100,000 
with directions to find another nonprofit agency that could serve as 
his organizational home. The Twentieth Century Fund and the 
Community Chest and Councils of America both refused his over-
tures; he was then driven to affiliate with the American Hospital As-
sociation. 
The tension between the idea of the Blue Cross as a representa-
tive of the interests of its subscribers and the Blue Cross as the 
financing arm of the hospitals now became a source of real institu-
tional discomfort. The AHA leapt at the opportunity to receive the 
Rosenwald funds; however, Dr. Rorem was determined not to allow 
the Blue Cross movement to become an arm of the hospitals' trade 
association. He therefore created a body known as the Commission 
on Hospital Service under the sponsorship of the AHA, but on which 
the AHA itself was not represented. As Rorem later said in an inter-
21. See generally 0. ANDERSON, STATE ENABLING LEGISLATION FOR NON-PROFIT HOSPI-
TAL AND MEDICAL PLANS (1944). 
22. See J. HIRSH, supra note 8, at 61-63. 
23. See E. WHITE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE. SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 173-89 (1962). 
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view, "We were a de facto self-determining organization. We would 
report to the trustees when we thought there was something interest-
ing to report, not because we thought it was any of their business.',24 
He selected the first members of the Committee for their records of 
public awareness, and for his confidence that "they could be relied 
on to keep hospital influence in its proper bounds.',25 Nonetheless, 
three of the four members of the first Commission were present or 
past presidents of the AHA, and all four were or had been adminis-
trators or trustees of major hospitals that were important elements of 
the hospital establishment.26 
Through the Commission, Dr. Rorem advocated passage of en-
abling legislation in the various states, assisted in the formation of 
Blue Cross plans, set standards for the use of the Blue Cross emblem 
by the various plans, and promoted sound administrative practices. 
In 1930, the Commission published a model law that incorporated 
the best features of existing enabling legislation.27 Dr. Rorem 
worked closely with various plans to obtain passage of the legislation 
in several states.28 
The social service orientation of the Blue Cross pioneers was un-
questionably genuine;29 indeed, in later interviews several of them 
have emphasized the difficulty they faced in persuading the hospitals 
to assume the risks associated with a guaranteed service benefit plan. 
They emphasized .the benefit to the public of good hospital service in 
time of need. Yet many of the administrators of participating hospi-
tals and even Blue Cross plan directors viewed Blue Cross princi-
pally as a source of badly needed revenues for the voluntary 
24. 0. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at 38. 
25. Id. at 39. 
26. See id. at 37-39. 
27. See Rorem, supra note 19, at 542-43 app. 
28. See 0. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at 40. 
29. Anderson notes that the four principal Blue Cross pioneers who laid the groundwork 
for Blue Cross during the 1930s (Van Dyk, Rorem, Van Steenwyk [who designed the symbol], 
and.Mannix [Michigan's first director)) were between the ages of25 and 36 when they began, 
and-that all "embodied the old fashioned virtues ofhard work, enlightened self-interest, enthu-
siasm, imagination, pragmatism, and dedication to the public interest." None of them was 
trained in medicine or had formal schooling in hospital administration, and none of them 
.came from a professional family. See id. at 29-30. 
Most of the early Blue Cross leaders continued to be active and influential in hospital and 
Blue Cross affairs for several more decades. Frank Van Dyk was instrumental in developing 
the New York Blue Cross organization and later joined the faculty of the Columbia University 
School of Public Health and Administrative Medicine, where he helped design New York's 
certificate-of-need laws in the early 1960s. C. Rufus Rorem served for many years as the 
Executive Director of the Allegheny County (Pa.) Hospital Planning Council; in 1960, when 
CON legislation was being formulated in New York, he went as a consultant to the Southern 
New York Hospital Review and Planning Council. 
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hospitals and as a bastion against governmental health insurance. 
The source of tension in the relationship would come to be the reim-
bursement policy. Would the Blue Cross behave as an agent of its 
subscribers in arm's-length negotiations with the hospitals, and at-
tempt to hold down hospital prices and therefore rates for its sub-
scribers? Or would the Blue Cross act as the agent of the hospitals, 
paying for any service the hospitals wished to provide at any price 
they wished to charge, and collect from Blue Cross subscribers suffi-
cient revenues to cover those charges? Hospital control of Blue 
Cross plans implied that the Blue Cross was the agent of the hospi-
tals; the public service rhetoric of the Blue Cross movement and the 
nonprofit form of the plans themselves suggested that the principal 
purpose of the Blue Cross was to make health care affordable to the 
public.30 This conflict, latent in., the beginning, became more pro-
nounced as the growth of private health insurance programs made 
the hospitals more dependent on third-party payment. The Blue 
Cross adopted the policy of full-cost retrospective reimbursement 
under which it rarely questioned hospital costs; the large voluntary 
30. The mystique of being "nonprofit" was critical to the public image, and perhaps also 
the self-image of the early Blue Cross plans. Nonprofit status enabled the hospital service 
plans to derive some of their initial financing in the form of grants and loans from foundations, 
community chests, and the hospitals themselves. See id. at 41; J. HIRSH, supra note 8, at 62. 
The nonprofit status of the hospital service plans was also consistent with the status and image 
of the participating hospitals, most of which were private nonprofit or governmental entities. 
As a legal matter, of course, nonprofit status means only that any surplus developed by the 
operation is not distributed to shareholders in the form of dividends. From this point of view, 
it is not unrealistic to characterize mutual insurance companies as nonprofit, since the only 
shareholders are the policyholders, to whom accrues any surplus. The Blue Cross pioneers 
meant something more, however, when they insisted that hospital service plans be nonprofit: 
they meant to project the image of the plans as community-sponsored institutions apart from 
the world of commerce. The primary practice that justified this characterization was the prac-
tice of "community rating." Community rating was doomed by the rise of competition; how-
ever, and Blue Cross plans moved rapidly toward experience rating as commercial insurers 
entered the market. See R. EILERS, supra note 10, at 210-24 and text at notes 32-33 infra. 
Another aspect of Blue Cross that was thought to be uniquely community-service oriented 
was that the contracting hospitals were legally bound to provide service to the subscribers even 
if the Blue Cross itself could not reimburse the hospital for the costs of the care. The sub-
scriber thus had a direct contractual relationship with the hospital, a community institution; 
there was theoretically no neeq for subscribers to worry about the solvency of the Blue Cross 
plan or its ability to manage large cash reserves. 
The final unique aspect of Blue Cross, so taken for granted at the time that it is rarely 
mentioned in the contemporary literature, is the prohibition on competition between Blue 
Cross plans. The Commission on Hospital Service standard expressly provides that "Plans 
should be established only where needs of a community are not adequately served by existing 
non-profit hospital service plans." As we have already noted, this provision stemmed from a 
concern that the subscriber be afforded free choice of doctors and hospitals at the time of 
illness. However, the ideal of one cooperative, inclusive organization is consistent with the 
hospital tradition of voluntary sector self-government. See Rorem, supra note 19, at 543-44. 
Although these special characteristics were touted as establishing the public-service nature 
of the Blue Cross plans, it is clear that Blue Cross derived its special service aura principally 
from its sponsors, the nonprofit voluntary hospitals, rather than from any particular financial 
or underwriting practices. 
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hospitals took advantage of the stable and generous financing pro-
vided by widespread health insurance to improve the quality and 
sophistication (and expense) of their services in accordance with 
evolving standards of medical practice. By the late 1950s, rising hos-
pital costs evoked both public concern and, in the states with large 
Blue Cross plans, political controversy over large and frequent Blue 
Cross rate increases. 
By the late 1950s the hospitals and the Blue Cross were forced to 
recognize their interdependence and to pull closely together. Rising 
hospital costs were making voluntary health insurance unaffordable 
for retired persons; seeing themselves pushed out of the private 
health insurance system, the elderly coalesced as a political force 
around their need for government assistance. High costs had also 
made it increasingly difficult for voluntary hospitals to provide free 
care of the aged and the poor; the political debate over what form 
this assistance should take revived the issue of government health 
insurance. 
The voluntary hospital establishment never opposed federal 
financing of health care costs as vigorously as did the American 
Medical Association, which represented physicians in private prac-
tice. The hospitals were accustomed to receiving state and local gov-
ernment reimbursement for the cost of caring for the poor, and the 
ties between the voluntary hospital and public health establishments 
had given the leaders of the voluntary hospitals experience in deal-
ing with government organizations and broad public concerns. The 
voluntary hospitals did not try to prevent the federal government 
from coming to the assistance of the poor and the aged but sought 
rather to channel government action so that it would complement 
rather than supplant the system of private health insurance and 
would not result in governmental domination of the voluntary hospi-
tals. 
The voluntary hospitals' chief bulwark against universal govern-
ment health insurance and therefore government domination was 
the system of private health insurance that was anchored by the Blue 
Cross. The Blue Cross was central not only to the hospitals' 
financial stability but to their institutional autonomy as well. As the 
Blue Cross came under financial pressure and political attack in the 
late 1950s the hospital establishment reasserted its leadership and 
drew the Blue Cross more closely into its orbit. By the end of the 
decade the Blue Cross had resolved the ambivalence in its relation-
ship with the hospitals: it had become their instrumentality. 
One of the circumstances driving the Blue Cross closer to the 
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hospitals was the rise of commercial health insurance. As health in-
surance became a popular fringe employment benefit in the postwar 
period, the Blue Cross began to experience strong competition from 
commercial insurance companies (principally life insurance compa-
nies) that could offer health insurance as part of comprehensive in-
surance packages that included life and disability insurance as well. 
The commercial insurance companies frequently used health insur-
ance as a loss leader to attract customers for these other more profit-
able forms of insurance, undercutting Blue Cross rates for health 
insurance in the process. More importantly, the large commercial 
insurance companies could offer uniform company-wide benefits 
under a single national contract to large employers with nationwide 
operations.31 The Blue Cross, by contrast, was not designed for a 
national economy. It consisted of a loose federation of largely au-
tonomous, fundamentally localist plans with different benefit struc-
tures and accounting practices. The challenge of the 1950s was to 
coordinate the plans sufficiently that a unified Blue Cross organiza-
tion could compete with the commercial insurance companies for 
national contracts. 32 
31. See Schonbrum, The Future of Blue Cross, 2 J. HEALTH POL., POLY & L. 319, 327-39 
(1977). Health insurance became one of the most popular employee fringe benefits in the 
postwar period, largely because the federal tax laws did not require employees to include in 
their own gross income the amount of their employer's contribution to the cost of their health 
insurance plans. See Steurle & Hoffman, Tax Expenditures far Health Care, 30 NATL. TAX J. 
IOI, 101-02 (1979). Another major impetus was the inclusion of employee welfare plans (in-
cluding health insurance plans) as a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under the Taft-
Hartley Act. See Inland Steel Co., 77 NLRB I, ajfd, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), ajfd o,; 
other grounds sub nom. American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); R. 
MUNTS, BARGAINING FOR HEALTH: LABOR UNIONS, HEALTH INSURANCE, AND MEDICAL 
CARE 9-12 (1967). 
32. Blue Cross made a vigorous effort to "go national." In 1946 the Commission on Hospi-
tal Service founded by Dr. Rorem had been redesigned to form the Blue Cross Commission, 
which served as the national coordinating agency among the various state and provincial plans 
(Canadian plans were affiliated at the time but later withdrew). The BCC operated as a com-
mission of the American Hospital Association. In 1949 the Blue Cross Commisson formed the 
Blue Cross Association, a nonprofit corporation, for the purpose of establishing a stock na-
tional insurance company, Health Services, Inc., to provide uniform group benefits on a na-
tional basis. It replaced the local Benefit Agreement for National Accounts, which had left 
administrative control over joint arrangements in the hands of local plans. 
Health Service, Inc. did not, however, capture the national market. Competition with com-
mercial carriers had become very intense. By 1955 growing dismay prompted leaders of the 
most successful Blue Cross plans to meet discreetly to develop a strategy for national enroll-
ment. These efforts were channeled through the Blue Cross Association, the Blue Cross plans' 
own organization, rather than the Blue Cross Commission affiliated with the AHA. 
In 1960 the AHA and the Blue Cross Commission membership voted to merge the func-
tions of the Blue Cross Co=ission and the BCA. The AHA dissolved its Blue Cross Com-
mission and formed the AHA Council on Blue Cross Prepayment and Financing, one half of 
whose members were Blue Cross personnel, to supervise the approval of new Blue Cross plans, 
licensing of the Blue Cross symbol, and hospital reimbursement methods. The BCA itself 
assumed those functions of the old Blue Cross Co=ission concerned primarily with ·the na-
tional interrelationships of the plans. The BCA and the AHA established an interlocking 
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The Blue Cross and the voluntary hospital establishment did not 
welcome the rise of commercial health insurance: competition 
threatened the internal subsidies within the Blue Cross rate structure 
and therefore its viability as a substitute for government health in-
surance. The Blue Cross's role structure was based on the principle 
of "community rating," under which subscriber rates represented a 
pooling of risk among low-risk and high-risk groups. Commercial 
insurers could undersell the Blue Cross by o.ff ering lower premiums 
to groups with more favorable hospital utilization experience, a prac-
tice known as "experience rating." If the Blue Cross met the com-
mercial competition by lowering its rates to the low-risk groups, it 
was forced to increase rates for higher-risk groups, who tended also 
to have limited .financial resources because they were retired, or lived 
in rural areas, or worked in low-paying employment. 
Competition thus impaired the ability of the Blue Cross to hold 
itself out as a substitute for government health insurance that could 
offer affordable protection to high-risk groups. At the same time, 
commercial companies were not an altogether reliable source of 
health insurance even for low-risk groups. Not being committed to 
making health insurance available to the public, commercial insur-
ance companies might off er health insurance one year but not the 
next. Although they competed with the Blue Cross in its most attrac-
tive markets, they did not serve the same function vis-a-vis the vol-
untary hospitals that the Blue Cross served, which was to provide a 
stable and affordable alternative to government health insurance for 
the broad middle ranges of the population. 
Finally, the commercial insurers were not committed to the hos-
pitals as institutions. They were in the business of writing insurance, 
not providing health care; they were not committed to generating a 
stable income for the hospitals and did not structure their policies, as 
the Blue Cross tended to do, to encourage hospital utilization. The 
commercial companies wrote indemnity contracts that included de-
ductibles or co-insurance, creating .financial disincentives to the use 
of hospital services; in a competitive environment they would natu-
rally be cost-conscious, and the hospitals feared that if the commer-
board membership: three AHA representatives served on the BCA board, two BCA represent-
atives on the AHA board. BCA moved into the AHA headquarters building in Chicago. 
The interlocking directorate between the AHA and the BCA lasted from 1960 until 1971, 
when the organizations decided to disentangle themselves. In 1972 the AHA transferred own-
ership of the Blue Cross name and emblems to the BCA. The severing of the organizations at 
the national level did not affect the compositions of the boards of directors of the state Blue 
Cross plans, most of which under state enabling statutes were required to have hospital repre-
sentatives. See 0. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at 69-73; R. EILER, supra note 10, at 55-69; S. 
LAW, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG? 19 (2d ed. 1976). 
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cial companies ever achieved dominance in the health insurance 
market they might use their market position to institute controls over 
the hospitals, including cost controls, that would constrain the 
growth of the hospital sector. 33 
The hospitals' symbiotic relationship with the Blue Cross allowed 
them to keep the commercial carriers at a distance. The hospitals 
and the Blue Cross also actively attempted to disadvantage the com-
mercial companies relative to the Blue Cross. The reimbursement 
formula negotiated between the Blue Cross and the hospitals typi-
cally resulted in a price advantage known as the "Blue Cross dis-
count." Hospitals also allowed Blue Cross subscribers, unlike 
commercially insured patients, to be admitted to the hospitals with-
out a deposit. 34 
Notwithstanding competition from commercial insurance com-
33. The Blue Shield, which is the physicians' service plan for medical and surgical benefits, 
was formed largely in order to protect physicians against oversight by independent health 
insurance plans. See generally Goldenberg & Greenberg, The Effect of Physician-Controlled 
Health Insurance: United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 2 J. HEALTH POL., POLY. & 
L. 48 (1977). 
34, Hospitals bill "charges" to patients who are responsible for their own hospital bills, 
including those covered by commercial insurance. By contrast, if a patient is a Blue Cross 
subscriber, the hospital recovers from the Blue Cross its cost of treatment under a reimburse-
ment formula specified in its contract with the Blue Cross. The customary method is simply to 
divide the hospital's total allowable costs by the number of its total patient days, producing a 
per diem rate that the Blue Cross pays for each day of subscriber hospitalization. The per diem 
rate thus derived is usually lower than the per diem "charges" billed to patients covered by 
commercial insurance. · The difference is commonly known as the "Blue Cross discount"; the 
commercial insurance companies believe that it gives the Blue Cross an unfair competitive 
advantage. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 361 F. Supp. 774 (W.D. Pa. 1972), qffd., 481 
F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973) (upholding the Blue Cross discount against 
antitrust challenge). 
In the late 1940s the commercial insurance companies attempted to eliminate the hospitals' 
practice of demanding deposits before admitting patients who were covered by commercial 
insurance. The commercials developed a means whereby the hospitals could quickly ascertain 
a patient's insurance status, and asked hospitals to discontinue the deposit requirement for 
patients whose status had been verified. 
The Michigan Hospital Association opposed the request after the executive director of the 
Michigan Blue Cross, with the support of several other members of the hospital association 
who were also Blue Cross directors, made an impassioned speech pointing out the importance 
to the hospitals of maintaining the competitive viability of the Blue Cross. Excerpts follow: 
Hospitals in many metropolitan areas are being subjected to a systematic and high-pow-
ered pressure campaign by the commercial insurance companies. . . . 
. . . The real objective of the insurance companies is to force the hospitals into an 
agreement that would give them a serious competitive advantage over Blue Cross. . . . 
... Let us suppose that after forcing the hospitals into arrangements that weakened 
Blue Cross, the insurance companies - six or a dozen of them - managed to develop the 
volume of business that Blue Cross has now, with Blue Cross forced into a secondary 
position .... 
. . . If private insurance should take away from Blue Cross such groups as General 
Motors, Ford, United States Steel and American Telephone and Telegraph, as they have 
already taken away Sears, Roebuck and Company, Burroughs Adding Machine, Standard 
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parries, the Blue Cross remained the dominant force in the health 
insurance market. Blue Cross was particularly strong in the eastern, 
midwestern, and New England states, which were also the states in 
which suburban growth posed a threat to existing large hospitals in 
older downtown areas. 
Not surprisingly, these were also the states in which the voluntary 
hospital establishment had long traditions of self-governance, able 
leadership, and close relationships with the public health establish-
ment. The problems and opportunities of the late 1950s in these 
states shaped the terms of the hospital-Blue Cross-public health 
alignment that gave rise to regulation of hospital construction 
through regional planning. 
Ill. FAULTS IN THE STRUCTURE: THE MICHIGAN BLUE CROSS IN 
WARTIME AND POST WAR PROSPERITY 
It was not until health insurance became widely available in the 
mid-1950s that rising hospital costs began to be perceived nationally 
as an inherent problem of the hospital industry. Michigan, however, 
whose Blue Cross plan grew rapidly during World War II, furnishes 
an early example of the dramatic hospital cost inflation that would 
erupt as a national pattern in the postwar period. We can also see in 
Michigan the increasing .financial interdependence of the voluntary 
hospitals and the Blue Cross as the hospitals came to rely on the 
Blue Cross for the major part of their income. 
The Michigan Blue Cross came into being in a familiar way. The 
Michigan Hospital Association had observed the progress of prepaid 
hospital service plans in various parts of the country, and early in 
1938 it resolved to promote a statewide plan for Michigan.35 The 
idea caught on quickly with local hospital associations, and the 
Michigan Hospital Service enrolled its first subscriber in March 
1939. 
Oil, Hudson Motor Company, and many others, then the beginning of the end of Blue 
Cross would be in sight . 
. . . Should Blue Cross be crippled, it will be but a short time before the government 
will take over. . . . 
In that eventuality there will be no hospital insurance business for either the private 
companies or Blue Cross. Then, of course, there will not be any private hospitals either. 
The hospitals face an issue of grave importance. The hospitals must make the deci-
sion. 
McNary, Hospitals Must Make the .Decision, HOSPITALS, Apr. 1951, at 76-80. In addition, see 
L. DRAKE & s. HANNA, HISTORY OF MICHIGAN HOSPITAL SERVICE, 1938-1951, at 56-57 (un-
dated; evidence suggests preparation during 1952). 
35. Unless otherwise noted, historical material in this part is drawn from L. DRAKE & S. 
HANNA, supra note 34. 
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Within a year of its founding, the Michigan plan had enrolled 
175,000 subscribers. By 1941 it had contracts with the major auto-
mobile manufacturers and a total of 225,000 subscribers: it had be-
come the second largest Blue Cross plan in the country. Its troubles 
began immediately.J6 
The problem was rising hospital costs. A year after bringing in 
the automobile company employees, Michigan Blue Cross had to 
raise its rates because hospital costs had increased by twenty-four 
percent from 1940 to 1942. A modest rate increase was accompanied 
by a liberalization of benefits. Enrollment continued to grow, and 
costs continued to rise. Rates were raised by fifteen percent in 1945, 
and benefits were again liberalized. When the increased revenue 
proved insufficient, rates were again raised in 1946. At the time, the 
cost increases were attributed to a war-time shortage of medical per-
sonnel, the unattractiveness of hospital employment because of bet-
ter opportunities in defense production, and a pent-up demand for 
medical services on the part of industrial workers and their families, 
many of whom had never before had access to professional medical 
services. Rising costs were thought to be a temporary problem that 
would disappear with the return of normal peacetime employment 
conditions. . 
In the meantime, however, the hospitals were becoming restive. 
Their service benefit contracts called for them to render specified 
services even if Blue Cross reimbursement did not cover their full 
costs. In January 1946 the Sisters of Mercy withdrew their fourteen 
hospitals from participation in Blue Cross, claiming that they were 
incurring losses on patients admitted under the plan. The with-
drawal of so many prominent institutions, coupled with widespread 
reports of the impending insolvency of Blue Cross, precipitated a 
crisis. The plan director, whose strength was in promoting enroll-
ment and who had no background in hospital administration, re-
signed. The staff. and board were reorganized. The Insurance 
Commissioner prohibited the plan from selling new contracts. 
The crisis of 1946 resulted in a critical realignment of Michigan 
Blue Cross objectives and operations toward a closer relationship 
with the hospitals and more sympathetic reimbursement practices. 
In order to attract back the Sisters of Mercy and to prevent the with-
drawal of other hospitals, the Board abandoned its practice of reim-
36. The wartime growth of hospital insurance was stimulated by the National War Labor 
Board's policy of allowing increases in nonwage benefits while wage increases were con-
strained by federal wage and price controls. See 0. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at 45. 
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bursing on a flat fee basis37 and moved to an actual-cost basis, with a 
preliminary payment of ninety percent of charges, subject to adjust-
ment after the determination of individual institutional costs.38 This 
more flexible policy satisfied the hospitals. Once the Blue Cross had 
accepted the premises of individualized full-cost retrospective reim-
bursement, however, its power to hold down its rates depended on its 
ability to force the hospitals to control their own costs. The close 
relationship between the Blue Cross and the hospitals made it im-
possible for the Blue Cross to exercise any such authority. Blue 
Cross rates would henceforth be tied directly to hospital costs. 
The increasing financial interdependence of the Michigan Blue 
Cross and the hospitals made it imperative that they establish a 
closer operating relationship. The first major action of the new Blue 
Cross executive director39 was to establish closer organizational ties 
between the Blue Cross and the participating hospitals by creating a 
new twelve-member Hospital Relations Committee, consisting of 
37. The original reimbursement practice of the Blue Cross plans was to pay the same per 
diem rates to all hospitals. This was consistent with the standard government practice in pay-
ing for charity patients. As the hospitals came to rely increasingly on Blue Cross reimburse• 
ment, however, they demanded recognition of their individual cost characteristics - size, 
teaching responsibilities, caseload mix, and similar factors - in the computation of costs. The 
hospitals did not engage in cost accounting except insofar as they needed to justify cost-based 
reimbursement rates to major third-party payers. The American Hospital Association's cost 
accounting manual, for example, was provided in response to the federal government's Emer-
gency Maternity and Infant Care program under which the government paid the cost of hospi-
tal care for the wives and dependents of military servicemen during World War II. See id. at 
43-44. The current generation of AHA standards were developed in order to influence the 
definition of "reasonable cost" under Medicare. See H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, MEDICARE 
AND THE HOSPITALS 154-58 (1967). 
38. See L. DRAKE & s. HANNA, supra note 34, at 39. 
39. The person hired by the Michigan Blue Cross in 1947 to be its executive director and 
general manager was William S. McNary, who had helped to found the Colorado Blue Cross 
plan and served as its director for ten years. Prior to that time he had been the business 
manager of the University of Colorado School of Medicine and Hospitals. The careers of Blue 
Cross leaders show a pattern of movement within the university hospitals, the public health 
establishment, and the Blue Cross. See notes 46, 84, 94 iefra. The first executive director of 
the Michigan Hospital Service (not McNary's immediate predecessor) was an authentic Blue 
Cross pioneer, John R. Mannix, who had come from the University Hospital in Cleveland, 
Ohio, the site of an early and successful hospital service plan. After leaving Michigan he 
returned to Cleveland to become director of the Blue Cross. 
George Bugbee, who served for many years as executive director of the American Hospital 
Association, had been an assistant director of the University Hospital in Ann Arbor, and then 
a member of the faculty at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business. He served 
as Co=issioner of Metropolitan General Hospital in Cleveland during the late 1930s and 
early 1940s, when Harold H. Burton, who later sponsored the Hill-Burton Act, was mayor of 
Cleveland. After leaving the AHA in 1954 Bugbee became the president of the Health Infor-
mation Foundation in New York; he is listed as having represented the New York City Blue 
Cross at the first legislative meetings held to design what became New York's certificate-of-
need laws. See NEW YORK JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE, REPORT ON HEALTH INSURANCE 
PLANS 45, Legislative Doc. No. 44 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 JT. COMM. REPORT]. From 
1962 to 1970 Bugbee served as the director of the Center for Health Administration Studies 
and the graduate program in hospital administration at the University of Chicago. 
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four trustees of the Michigan Hospital Service and eight members 
representing participating hospitals. The Hospital Relations Com-
mittee customarily met immediately before MRS Board meetings 
and screened Board agenda items involving hospital matters. The 
participating hospitals also formally controlled (1) twenty-one of the 
forty-one seats on the MRS board of Directors; (2) an unascertaina-
ble number of the "public representatives," many of whom were 
nominated by the hospitals; and (3) the hospital district councils, 
which had direct relationships with the Blue Cross staff.40 This orga-
nizational structure and staff ensured henceforth that Blue Cross pol-
icies would reflect more closely the institutional interests of the 
participating hospitals. "Hospital thought was now part and parcel 
of Blue Cross thought. The prepayment program had to meet the 
need of the people but also the need of the hospitals."41 
What direction would the new team take? In his first annual re-
port, the new President reported that: 
Hospital costs have risen more rapidly during the year 1947 than dur-
ing any other period, at least since World War I .... [H]ospital pay-
ments by Michigan Hospital Service have increased materially. These 
increases have come to a point where we can no longer operate except 
at a deficit, and some new method of handling the situation must be 
devised either by increasing premiums or changing hospital payments 
or bene.fits.42 
Certainly this assessment was accurate. The Blue Cross could 
theoretically have avoided further deficits by reducing the patients' 
entitlements to services or by allowing less generous reimbursement 
to the hospitals. In fact, however, the Michigan Hospital Service 
could do nothing but raise rates to subscribers: it did not control the 
level of benefits offered in its major contracts, which were arrived at 
in collective bargaining in the automobile industry, and it was pow-
erless to change the reimbursement formula that it had just negoti-
ated with the participating hospitals, a formula that would inevitably 
loosen whatever internal cost constraints had been encouraged 
within the participating hospitals by the flat fee reimbursement pol-
icy. Over the next two years premiums were raised twice -in 1948 
and 1949 - and benefits were liberalized, making the Michigan Blue 
Cross the most comprehensive and expensive plan in the country. 
The dynamics first evidenced in Michigan during the war were 
40. See L. DRAKE & s. HANNA, supra note 34, at 42-47. 
41. Id. at 48. 
42. Id. The new president of the Michigan Blue Cross was E. Dwight Barnett, the director 
of Harper Hospital, one of Detroit's largest and most prestigious hospitals. Shortly thereafter, 
Dr. Barnett became the head of the Columbia University Institute of Administrative Medicine. 
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repeated in other Blue Cross plans around the country. The Blue 
Cross grew dramatically in. the postwar period. Full-cost reimburse-
ment became standard; hospital costs rose rapidly, and the increas-
ing dependence of the hospitals on the Blue Cross made it necessary 
for the hospitals to pull the Blue Cross more tightly into their orbit. 
IV. THE POSTWAR PERIOD: EXPANSION, ANXIETY, AND THREAT 
The health care system grew dramatically in the 1950s along 
with, and in part because of, the spread of health insurance. Insur-
ance had liberated voluntary hospital administrators from the need 
to rely on charitable fundraising drives for their operating income. 
The dominant trend in the 1950s was one of growth, both of individ-
ual hospitals and of the system as a whole, as metropolitan areas 
mushroomed. But growth threatened to produce a great heterogene-
ity of institutions: an established 500-bed voluntary hospital in a 
central city might well find another 100-bed institution being 
planned for half a mile away, a 25-bed hospital being built around 
the comer, construction in progress on two 200-bed facilities within a 
five mile radius, and talk of three more 250-bed hospitals in the in-
ner suburban ring. All of these hospitals would typically meet state 
licensing requirements, which dealt principally with minimum con-
struction standards. All of them would be economically viable be-
cause health insurance had stimulated an apparently insatiable 
demand for hospital services. 
Unplanned growth threatened the large downtown voluntary 
hospitals, which after the mid-1950s were facing the drain of middle-
class patients and financial resources out of the center cities. This 
migration did not mean that the large hospitals would go out of 
existence; it did mean that they could lose their pre-eminence. The 
large voluntary hospitals usually had teaching programs and often 
were affiliated with medical schools. They were the centers of elite 
medical practice. Nearly all of them had been built before the De-
pression. Newer hospitals with more attractive and modem facili-
ties, located close to the places where the middle-classes were 
moving their homes, might well attract specialist-physicians to their 
staffs and disperse the pool of patients most suitable as teaching ma-
terial, resulting in a decline of the teaching function of the large 
downtown voluntary hospitals. Teaching hospitals needed teaching 
patients. And it was the teaching function - and the resulting pres-
ence of residents and interns on the hospital "house staffs" - that 
made possible the specialized and sophisticated care on which the 
reputations of the large institutions were founded. 
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The demographic and market forces that threatened the large 
voluntary hospitals imperiled an entire system of interrelationships 
among those hospitals, the medical schools, the research-funding 
government agencies, and the private foundations. These institu-
tions had centered their activities on the large voluntary teaching 
hospital. Their preferences had been adopted as basic federal policy 
in the Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946, known popu-
larly as the Hill-Burton Act.43 The United States Public Health 
Service and the state agencies charged with hospital planning under 
the Hill-Burton Act now joined forces with the voluntary hospital 
establishment to support the large voluntary hospitals. They pro-
posed to control growth through regional hospital planning. They 
were supported by the voluntary hospitals' planning councils. 
The idea of hospital planning predated the 1946 Hill-Burton Act. 
Hospital planning had first been seriously undertaken during the 
boom years of the 1920s - a time when it seemed important to pro-
vide the public with sufficient hospital facilities.44 Efforts to quantify 
a proper proportion of hospital beds to population, sponsored by pri-
vate foundations and the American Hospital Association, continued 
throughout the decade. These studies were concerned primarily with 
the gross ratio of beds to population; they did not focus on relation-
ships among the hospitals themselves. The idea of a regionally coor-
dinated health care system was discussed nationally in the mid-
1940s, when the hospital establishment began to plan for the postwar 
era.45 The large modern hospital was to be the center of the system; 
working relationships between larger and smaller hospitals were to 
be developed to foster the dissemination of advanced medical tech-
niques. In addition, hospitals within a region were to interchange 
services and equipment and arrange for the integration of services 
43. Pua. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-2910 
(1976)). Although the Hill-Burton Act was designed to aid construction of rural hospitals and 
in fact resulted in the construction of many smaller hospitals in underserved areas, the theory 
was that these hospitals would be satellites to larger voluntary hospitals in urban or "base" 
areas. 
44. The first serious study was undertaken by the New York Academy of Medicine in 
1920. See J. MAY, HEALTH PLANNING: ITS PAST AND POTENTIAL 13-40 (1967), for a review of 
health planning prior to the Hill-Burton Act. 
45. See id. at 19-22. See generally COMMISSION ON HOSPITAL CARE, HOSPITAL CARE IN 
THE UNITED STATES (1947). The Commission was established under the sponsorship of the 
AHA Committee on Postwar Planning, and was financed with grants from the Commonwealth 
Fund, the W. K. Kellogg Foundation, and the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis. Its 
recommendations are closely identified with the Commonwealth Fund, which published the 
final study. The study director of the Commission was Arthur C. Backmeyer, who was direc-
tor of the University Clinics and associate dean of the division of biological sciences at the 
University of Chicago. He had previously served as president of the American Hospital Asso-
ciation. 
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among institutions.46 
The original Hill-Burton Act endorsed both the idea of a quanti-
fied standard for determining the proper ratio of hospital beds to 
population and the idea of a tiered regional hospital system centered 
on large institutions in urban areas, coordinated through commu-
nity-based, voluntary planning agencies operating under state gui-
dance. The Act was designed to bring the best scientific medicine as 
practiced and taught in the finest hospitals within the geographical 
reach of all Americans. 47 
In drafting men for service in World War II, the army had dis-
covered that a large percentage of the draftees were unfit for service, 
particularly draftees from medically underserved rural areas. The 
nationwide program of hospital construction, authorized by the Hill-
Burton Act, was intended to distribute high-quality hospitals more 
· evenly throughout the country in order to allow returning service-
men to continue to enjoy the standard of care to which they had 
become accustomed in the military. It was also intended to provide 
practice opportunities for military doctors who had become accus-
46. The Commission on Hospital Care advocated a system of formal relationships among 
the hospitals, and suggested that government might force the hospitals to coordinate their ac-
tivities if they failed to do so voluntarily. This idea was highly distasteful to the hospitals and 
found few adherents. See J. MAY, supra note 44, at 19-24. The voluntary hospitals believe 
they should be left alone to plan and coordinate among themselves, with some participation by 
major consumer groups such as business and labor and by community leaders committed to 
the values of the voluntary system. The public health establishment has supported voluntary 
self-government, but believes in selective government intervention where private action fails to 
protect important public interests. The leadership of the university-based element of the pub-
lic health establishment, which is frequently called upon to help resolve disputes over whether 
government intervention to solve a particular problem is necessary or desirable, has frequently 
advocated government intervention to support elite voluntary decisionmaking. 
The person who was credited with having first suggested government licensing of hospital 
construction as a response to the political pressure for cost containment in the late 1950s was 
Ray E. Brown. See note 81 i'!fra. The person who persuaded the New York hospital estab-
lishment that construction licensing was in its collective best interest was Dr. Ray Trussell, 
Dean of the Columbia University School of Public Health and Administrative Medicine. See 
text at note 83 i'!fra. Dr. Trussell has told the authors that he used the advisory committees to 
the Trussell Report study team as a forum in which to work out doubts about the necessity and 
wisdom of seeking government action. 
47. This Article will use the following terminology in describing hospital size unless the 
context indicates otherwise: 
"smallest": fewer than 50 beds 
"small": fewer than 100 beds 
"intermediate": 100-200 beds 
"large" or "larger": 200 or more beds 
"largest": 500 or more beds 
Many hospitals operate internship and residency postgraduate training programs for physi-
cians. All hospitals with such programs will be described as "teaching hospitals." Some such 
institutions have formal relationships with medical schools and will be described as "medical 
school affiliates." Hospitals that are owned by universities will be described as "university 
hospitals." These designations are unrelated to size unless indicated by the context. 
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tamed to high-quality facilities,48 on the theory that good doctors 
would locate in communities with good hospitals. The program also 
responded to Congress' need to stimulate the postwar economy. 
The Hill-Burton Act marked the first major federal government 
involvement in general health matters. It made possible a great ex-
pansion of hospital capacity throughout the nation, chiefly in non-
profit hospitals; it also enshrined in federal law, policy, and institu-
tions the thinking and preferred institutional arrangements of the 
voluntary hospital establishment.49 It was in fact the product of a 
close collaboration between the United States Public Health Service 
and the American Hospital Association. 50 
48. Students of the welfare state have noted that expenditures for national equality-pro-
moting social programs typically rise as a result of universal military service. See M. JA-
NOWITZ, THE LAST HALF-CENTURY 165-66 (1978); H. WILENSKY, THE WELFARE STATE AND 
EQUALITY 70-74 (1975). The Hill-Burton Act can usefully be viewed as a politically achieva-
ble alternative to national health insurance, which was opposed bitterly by the private health 
care sector. The American Hospital Association prevented the American Medical Association 
from opposing the Hill-Burton Act. Although the AMA in principle approved of providing 
more hospital facilities to support the private practice of medicine, it suspected (prophetically) 
that hospital construction would lead to an increasing emphasis on specialists to the detriment 
of general practitioners, who were the backbone of the AMA's constituency. 
The Act also contained one of the first federal nondiscrimination provisions, forbidding a 
hospital receiving Hill-Burton funds to discriminate on the basis of race, creed or color; it 
incorporated, however, the prevailing "separate-but-equal" standard allowing state plans to 
provide separate facilities on the basis of need for separate population groups, as long as facili-
ties and services were of like quality. See Hospital Survey and Construction (Hill-Burton) 
Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 622(f), 60 Stat. 1043 (1946); Hearings Before the Comm. on Educa-
tion and Labor on S. 1661, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 318-20 (1945) (testimony of Dr. Dorothy 
Boulding Ferebee on behalf of the National Nonpartisan Council on Public Affairs of Alpha 
Kappa Alpha Sorority). 
49. The continuing influence of the voluntary sector in implementing the Hill-Burton Act 
was assured by requirements that public officials at all levels consult with the leaders of the 
hospital industry and other voluntary groups with an interest in health policy prior to formu-
lating public policies. Participating states were required to appoint state advisory councils to 
represent nongovernment organizations, consumer interests, and state agencies concerned with 
the operation, construction, or utilization of hospitals. See Hospital Survey and Construction 
(Hill-Burton) Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 612(a)(2), 60 Stat. 1041 (1946). The Surgeon General 
of the United States, who was charged with developing administrative rules and regulations, 
was directed to consult with a Federal Hospital Council consisting of eight members in addi-
tion to himself. Four members were to be persons "outstanding in fields pertaining to hospital 
and health activities, three of whom shall be authorities in matters relating to the operation of 
hospitals," and the other four were to be appointed to represent the consumers but did not 
apparently have to be consumers themselves. These last four were to be "persons familiar with 
the need for hospital services in urban or rural areas." See Hospital Survey and Construction 
(Hill-Burton) Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 633, 60 Stat. 1048 (1946). 
The Hill-Burton Act affirmed the primacy of voluntary sector and state governments in the 
construction and operation of hospitals. It also enshrined in federal policy the idea first devel-
oped by the voluntary hospitals that the distribution of hospitals should be based on need, 
determined objectively and expressed as the ratio of hospital beds to population. Planners 
became accustomed to thinking of the number of hospital beds as a measure of hospital system 
capacity. When hospital costs became a major problem in the late 1950s, the planners equated 
controlling the number of hospital beds with controlling hospital costs. See Appendix I, iefra. 
50. In an interview granted much later, George A. Bugbee, who served as executive direc-
tor of the American Hospital Association from 1943 to 1954, referred to passage of the Hill-
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Hill-Burton planning was intended to encourage the most sophis-
ticated hospitals to dominate the health care system: within the 
overall constraint of 4.5 beds per thousand population, state agencies 
were to decide which areas should constitute base areas ( containing 
a medical school or hospital of more than 200 beds), intermediate 
areas (containing more than 25,000 population and at least one hos-
pital with more than 100 beds) and rural areas (the residual cate-
gory). Hospitals in the base areas would be centers for teaching, 
research and sophisticated referral care; they would disseminate the 
best medical practice throughout their regions and would attract 
doctors seeking opportunities for specialty practice.51 
Although the idea of regional planning underlay the Hill-Burton 
Act, the only authority over construction decisions of the voluntary 
hospitals that the planning agencies derived from the Act was their 
ability to grant or deny Hill-Burton funds. In states with high per 
capita incomes and therefore low Hill-Burton allotments, the contri-
bution made by the Hill-Burton program to hospital capital forma-
tion was quite modest.52 The actual influence of the Hill-Burton Act 
on the pattern of hospital construction in major metropolitan areas 
in the 1950s was therefore slight. 
The Hill-Burton Act required that planning be carried out by re-
gions; however, the regional planning agencies entrusted with this 
task, most of which were the creations of state government, did not 
Burton Act as the single most importa]1.t achievement of the AHA in the 1940s. See Crosby, 
An Interview with George Bugbee, HOSPITALS, Jan. 1, 1959, at 34-35. A pilot survey of bed 
needs done by the Commission on Hospital Care had been the basis for the Act and for many 
of the regulations and administrative practices incorporated into it. See 2 W. MCNERNEY, 
HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL ECONOMICS 1371 (1962). 
51. The Hill-Burton scheme committed health planners to protect the quality of the base 
hospitals, which had to be large enough to support the facilities necessary for sophisticated 
care. Any health care system therefore had to be designed to provide the base hospitals with 
sufficient patients to fill their beds and maintain their teaching programs. See Klarman, Plan-
ning far Facilities in U.S. DEPT. OF H.E.W., REGIONALIZATION AND HEALTH POLICY 25 
(1977). Regionalization also contemplated a division of the market for patients: the base hos-
pitals were to be referral hospitals for the most difficult cases. Theoretically, community hos-
pitals (100-200 beds) serving intermediate areas would handle only routine problems; rural 
hospitals could be small (30-50 beds) even though small hospitals were generally disfavored. 
All proponents of the legislation had an interest in preventing the Hill-Burton program 
from becoming a federal pork barrel program. The program was designed as a system of 
grants-in-aid to state governments, with a distribution formula that provided a higher federal 
share to states with lower per capita incomes. See Hospital Survey and Construction (Hill-
Burton) Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 631, 60 Stat. 1046 (1946). In order to forestall the possibil-
ity of political domination of construction decisions, the Act required that the state survey its 
hospital needs under federal planning guidelines, see Hospital Survey and Construction (Hill-
Burton) Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 623, 60 Stat. 1043-44 (1946). The U.S. Public Health Serv-
ice had given its imprimatur to the idea that 4.5 short-term general beds per thousand popula-
tion was appropriate; this number became the federal standard under the Hill-Burton Act. See 
J. MAY, supra note 44, at 16. 
52. See J. LAVE & L. LAVE, THE HOSPITAL CONSTRUCTION ACT 17-18 (1974). 
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have authority to force cooperation between and among voluntary 
hospitals as the fully articulated regional planning concept required. 
In most of the country, the regional planning concept lay dormant. 
In a few states, however, including Michigan and New York, the 
hospitals' own voluntary regional planning councils had predated 
the Act.53 They represented the voluntary hospitals' commitment to 
both collective self-governance and the regional planning idea that 
had been incorporated into the Act itself. The activities of these 
councils during the late 1940s and early 1950s made concrete the 
idea of regional planning as collective and cooperative action among 
the voluntary hospitals. When the regional planning concept in the 
Hill-Burton Act was revived in the late 1950s, these councils were 
looked to as models. 
The revitalization of regional planning was a joint undertaking 
of the American Health Association and the United States Public 
Health Service. In 1959 these two organizations sponsored four ma-
jor regional conferences titled "Principles for Planning the Future 
Hospital System."54 These efforts matured into federal comprehen-
sive health planning legislation in the 1960s. The sponsorship of 
these conferences by the United States Public Health Service reaf-
firmed the federal government's support of the principles of regional 
planning as practiced by the major voluntary hospital councils. 
By the late 1950s, however, the concept of regional planning had 
been modified in light of the new problems created by suburban 
53. In Michigan the Greater Detroit Area Hospital Council was one of the early commu-
nity-based voluntary planning agencies. In addition to its coordination functions it was al-
ready involved in reviewing proposals for construction by voluntary hospitals and in 
channeling suburban hospital growth. See 2 W. MCNERNEY, supra note 50, at 1255. 
In New York, similar councils had existed in New York City and Rochester before the 
advent of the Hill-Burton program as voluntary community-wide planning agencies. The 
Hospital Council of Greater New York, in addition to holding Hill-Burton authority, com-
monly reviewed proposals for construction or expansion submitted by the voluntary hospitals 
built with private funds in the New York metropolitan area. So far as we have been able to 
determine, no other council in New York State had such a role with respect to voluntary 
hospitals. . 
Agencies such as these must be seen as part of the hospitals' general allegiance to the 
practices of elite voluntarism, which have historically included united fundraising campaigns 
and collective planning for voluntary social service agencies on a community-wide or regional 
level. See w. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE 80 (2d ed. 1979); PEOPLE 
AND EVENTS: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED WAY 20, 39 (1977); J. SEELEY, B. JUNKER & R. 
JONES, COMMUNITY CHEST 19-21 (1957). See generally F. WATSON, THE CHARITY ORGANI-
ZATION MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 222 (1922). 
54. See U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, PRINCIPLES FOR PLANNING THE FUTURE HOSPI-
TAL SYSTEM (1959). In 1961, the United States Public Health Service and the American Hos-
pital Association issued their influential report AREAWIDE PLANNING FOR HOSPITALS AND 
RELATED FACILITIES. See note 68 i,ifi-a. The fact that Jack Masur, M.D., the Assistant Sur-
geon General of the United States, became President-elect of the American Hospital Associa-
tion in 1960 is further evidence of the close relationship between the two organizations. 
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growth. The purpose of regional planning as originally expressed in 
the Hill-Burton Act was. to bring hospitals to sparsely-populated1 
medically underserved areas that could not generate sufficient capi-
tal to provide adequate hospital facilities. The problem posed by the 
suburban building boom of the 1950s was almost exactly the oppo-
site. Hospital construction was proceeding too rapidly, in response 
to high effective demand. The purpose of regional planning in the 
1950s was to inhibit capital formation and to structure the growth of 
the hospital industry in suburban areas. It was the voluntary hospi-
tal and public health leadership, particularly in areas with older, 
more established planning councils, that adapted the concept of a 
tiered regional system, originally formulated as a division of respon-
siblity between urban, small town, and rural hospitals, into a model 
applicable to hospitals within an urban area. All hospitals within a 
metropolitan area were to be large, if possible, but hospitals would 
be distinguished by their functions. The downtown hospitals would 
be tertiary care institutions; the others would be community hospi-
tals that would continue to refer teaching material to the more so-
phisticated institutions. Michigan, with a long tradition of voluntary 
hospital collective self-governance, provided leadership in the revi-
val of planning, which came to be called "areawide planning." 
Early in the 1950s, the Detroit District Hospital Council at-
tempted to channel suburban hospital construction into a tiered re-
gional pattern. It generated private capital for hospital construction 
in the growing suburban areas through the Metropolitan Detroit 
Building Fund Appeal, which campaigned in 1951 and again in 
1957. Funds were raised for an orderly expansion of the total metro-
politan hospital system: four 250-bed hospitals were built in the sub-
urban areas, and were designed to be satellites to the downtown 
private voluntary teaching hospitals. 55 The success of this planning 
effort depended, however, on the Council's ability not only to gener-
ate capital for the projects it favored, but also to prevent the creation 
of hospitals that were not part of its plan. This it could not do: hos-
pitals were springing up all over the Detroit metropolitan area at just 
the time when the planned hospital construction was about to be 
completed with proceeds from the second building fund drive. The 
effective market demand for hospital services, buoyed by widespread 
health insurance, could have absorbed all of the new beds, author-
ized or not. The problem was that the cost of using the unauthorized 
55. The account of the building of the suburban hospitals is based on an oral history sup-
plied to the authors by Symond Gottlieb, director of the Greater Detroit Area Hospital Coun-
cil. 
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beds would be billed to the Michigan Blue Cross, which, like other 
major Blue Cross plans in the northeast and midwest, was in a state 
of :financial panic. 
The Blue Cross was required to reimburse the hospitals for the 
cost of rendering care to Blue Cross subscribers, but its own rates 
were controlled by state insurance commissioners. If subscriber rate 
increases lagged behind hospital cost increases, the Blue Cross would 
operate at a current deficit, would be forced to invade its reserves, 
and might even become bankrupt. On the other hand, frequent re-
quests for rate increases exposed the hospitals and the Blue Cross to 
public controversy and political attack: largely because of the insur-
ance commissioners' review function, rising hospital costs became a 
political issue in states with large Blue Cross plans. 
By the late 1950s the forces leading to the hospital cost spiral had 
been identified. They included (1) inflationary increases in the cost 
of service even if the unit of service (e.g. , dressing a simple wound) 
was held constant; (2) the increasing technical sophistication of serv-
ices available (e.g., diagnostic radioisotopes); and (3) the increasing 
effective demand for hospital services resulting from progressively 
liberalized benefits in Blue Cross contracts. All of the foregoing 
trends, together with the mounting number of hospital beds in which 
patients could receive increasingly costly services, accounted for the 
steady rise in Blue Cross rates. 
The public health and hospital establishments regarded most of 
these cost increases not as problems but as indicia of the success of 
the Blue Cross in bringing quality health care to the American peo-
ple. The Michigan Blue Cross reported that every rate increase had 
been associated with an increase in benefits and pointed with satis-
faction to "the remarkable job that is being done in Michigan . . . 
by the standard Comprehensive Blue Cross contract."56 Although 
demand could theoretically have been reduced by instituting more 
limited coverage options, the Blue Cross reported that employees in 
Michigan, like federal workers, overwhelmingly chose high rather 
than low benefit coverage when offered the option.57 The public 
health and hospital establishments similarly defended the cost in-
creases that resulted from increases in quality, such as the more in-
tensive use of equipment and employees per bed required by 
sophisticated treatment methods. 58 
56. MICHIGAN HOSPITAL SERVICE, THE STATUS AND OPERATION OF MICHIGAN HOSPITAL 
SERVICE 35 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 MHS REPORT TO THE COMMR.). 
57. See id. at 36. 
58. See id. at 75. 
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Other causes of increasing costs were also considered either una-
voidable or actually desira,ble. Competition for workers after World 
War II had led to higher wages for all workers, including tradition-
ally underpaid hospital employees. Hospital cost increases that re-
flected catch-up wage increases or reductions in the previously 
standard sixty-five hour workweek for hospital workers were easily 
justified.59 Finally, some of the increase in per diem rates reflected 
more intensive utilization of beds: since patients tend to need more 
services during their first few days of hospitalization, more frequent 
patient turnover results in higher per diem costs that nonetheless may 
reflect a trend toward lower costs per patient. 60 
The reasons for individual hospital cost increases must be distin-
guished from the reasons for Blue Cross rate increases. The per diem 
charge to the Blue Cross under full-cost reimbursement principles 
represents fully allocated costs. The Blue Cross must therefore pay 
its share61 of the fixed cost of the total hospital system (facilities and 
equipment) plus the costs that vary with patient utilization (e.g. , the 
number of bandages used). Blue Cross rates therefore depend on the 
total capital devoted to the hospital system and the variable costs 
generated by subscriber hospital utilization patterns (which in tum 
depend on how many subscribers are in the hospital during the 
course of a year, their average length of stay, and the nature of the 
illnesses for which they are hospitalized). 
As its costs rose rapidly during the 1950s, the Michigan Blue 
Cross was caught in a dilemma. Most of the cost increases were due 
to factors discussed above that could be considered desirable. Some 
savings could be effected by shortening the average patient's length 
of stay, but the Blue Cross lacked the power and the desire to inter-
fere in medical judgments. 62 It decided that the one thing it could 
control was the number of hospital beds. Areawide planning of hos-
pital facilities provided the answer: the Blue Cross and the hospital 
planning council decided to use the· Blue Cross dominance in the 
health insurance market to ensure that no more hospitals would be 
built without their approval, and to close the existing small hospi-
59. See id. at 74. 
60. See id. at 75. 
61. The Blue Cross share will be determined by the number of a hospital's patients that are 
Blue Cross subscribers, where the hospital is a "participating hospital"; to nonparticipating 
hospitals, Blue Cross plans usually pay a flat fee not based on the institution's own costs. 
62. At about this time the idea of physician peer review to reduce length of stay and unnec-
essary utilization began to be suggested seriously. See 1961 MHS REPORT TO THE COMMR., 
supra note 56, at 43-44; SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND ADMINISTRATIVE MEDICINE, PRE· 
PAYMENT FOR HOSPITAL CARE IN NEW YORK STATE: A REPORT ON THE EIGHT BLUE CROSS 
PLANS SERVING NEW YORK RESIDENTS 9 (1960) [hereinafter cited as TRUSSELL REPORT], 
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tals.63 The Blue Cross determined that (1) only high-quality hospi-
tals would be allowed to become "participating hospitals" and thus 
be eligible for full-cost reimbursement and (2) capital costs would be 
reimbursed only for new beds planned and built in accordance with 
community need.64 Participation in the Blue Cross plan, in other 
words, was to be available only to large voluntary hospitals that con-
sented to submit to a collective planning process. 
If the planning council and the Blue Cross had been attempting 
to maximize cost savings by these actions, they would have missed 
their target. The smaller hospitals were the less expensive hospitals 
63. The hospital establishment's hostility to small hospitals can be understood as an effort 
to reduce the amount of competition in the hospital industry. Smaller hospitals can provide 
service to patients with uncomplicated diagnoses at lower average cost than larger hospitals 
whose average fully-allocated costs contain internal subsidies. The larger hospitals feared 
"cream skimming" - they feared that the smaller hospitals would attract the primary-care 
patients. Larger hospitals need primary-care patients not only to subsidize more expensive 
treatment of other patients, but also to provide subjects for their teaching programs and to 
protect their market for referral services. A dispersion of the pool of primary-care patients 
would force a reorganization of the teaching function to the detriment of the large hospitals. 
The presence of primary-care patients in large hospitals also conceals the actual costs of so-
phisticated types of treatment from the public and the third-party payor, thus reducing the 
potential for public controversy over the costs and benefits of such treatment. 
In addition, the small hospitals posed several threats to the professional dominance of the 
existing large hospitals. First, the smallest hospitals (under 50 beds), which were either 
proprietaries or closely associated with a few doctors, were outside the standards of elite medi-
cal practice to which the large hospitals and their staffs were committed. Second, the small 
hospitals (50-100 beds) were a danger both because they could divert primary-care patients 
and because any one of them could grow into a larger institution. The market for medical 
services, sustained by health insurance, could apparently support any number of community 
hospitals; any existing respectable hospital could establish a genuine community base, seek 
charitable funds for capital expansion, and offer practice opportunities for doctors seeking staff 
privileges. The strategy of the hospital establishment was to force these smaller institutions to 
close or merge, thereby reducing the number of potential centers of hospital growth. Third, 
the intermediate-sized institutions (100-200 beds) could grow into genuinely large institutions. 
The public health and hospital establishments recognized from the beginning that the sub-
urbs required good community hospitals, preferably large hospitals. Initially the plan was to 
allow them to become respectable satellites to the core institutions; however, the movement of 
population to the suburbs resulted in a shift of bargaining power within the hospital establish-
ment itself, with the consequence that many of these satellite community hospitals became 
regional centers in their own right. In the Detroit area, the four suburban hospitals authorized 
by the planning council (Oakwood, Beaumont, St. John, and Sinai) have since developed into 
tertiary care institutions. 
64. The standards are set out in the 1961 MHS REPORT To THE CoMMR., supra note 56, at 
18-20, 111-15. The standards, which were adopted by the Michigan Hospital Service Board of 
Trustees in January 1960, required that all participating hospitals maintain professional stan-
dards of operation appropriate to a general hospital, have an organized medical staff, meet all 
licensing and accreditation standards of the state, hold memberships in the appropriate na-
tional, state and local hospital councils and associations, and be accredited by the appropriate 
professional organizations. The Michigan Blue Cross enabling statute had restricted partici-
pating status to nonprofit hospitals; the 1960 standards required that the hospitals also be com-
munity sponsored and governed. Finally, the standards required that the hospitals "must have 
been planned and built in response to an established and recognized need for additional hospi-
tal beds" and that "the size of the hospital must be consistent with the needs of the community 
and must be large enough at an absolute minimum to insure that adequate levels of patient 
care can be maintained without prohibitive cost." Id. at 18-19. 
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- the smaller the cheaper.65 Eliminating them would only force pa-
tients into larger hospitals with higher costs. Channeling new hospi-
tal construction into a regionalized pattern would necessarily lead to 
a more concentrated industry with fewer but larger hospitals, 66 
thereby accelerating the rising trend of the costs billed to Blue Cross 
and intensifying the need for Blue Cross rate increases. Viewed as a 
cost control program, the Blue Cross standards were implausible.67 
As we have seen, however, controlling cost was only one goal 
among many. Other goals of the hospital and public health estab-
lishments were to enhance quality and to improve access to service, 
and they were willing to tolerate rising costs attributable to rising 
quality or increasing utilization of services. They also believed that 
all hospitals within' urban or base areas should conform to the evolv-
ing standards of elite medical practice, which required that they be 
large enough to support the administrative organization, patient 
services, and staff education functions that were regarded as the indi-
cia of quality.68 Bringing all hospitals up to these standards would 
65. Among Detroit area hospitals in 1958, the average cost per patient day of voluntary 
hospitals with fewer than 100 beds was $27.15; the per diem cost in hospitals of 100-249 beds 
was $31.71, for 250-499 beds $33.99, and for hospitals of over 500 beds $36.27. There were 
also fewer total beds in the smaller institutions. In the Detroit area, the 50 hospitals with 100 
or fewer beds together accounted for only 2312 beds; the seven hospitals in the same area with 
more than 500 beds together accounted for 4741 beds, more than twice as many. It is (and was 
in 1958) well understood that hospital costs increase with the size of the hospital. See 2 W. 
MCNERNEY, supra note 50, at 731, 735. 
66. As a conceptual guide to metropolitan hospital planning the idea of the tiered regional 
system was crude. Clearly it would make no sense to place a 500-bed hospital at the very 
periphery of a large metropolitan area. Within the denser parts of an urban area, however, 
there might be ample support for several hospitals of 200 or more beds. Some of these hospi-
tals could be referral centers for sophisticated care; some or even most of them probably could 
be community hospitals. The concept of regional planning furnishes little guidance as to 
which hospitals should be allowed to grow into what we now call tertiary care facilities and 
which should be forced to remain as community hospitals. Moreover, the concept of regional-
ization does not address demographic shifts that produce new centers of gravity within a met-
ropolitan area. Without violating any basic principles, therefore, all hospitals within urban or 
"base" areas were entitled to aspire to become referral centers. The only constraint on their 
aspirations was the idea of community "need," which was to be determined through voluntary 
planning. 
In the absence of standards, however, collective "planning" degenerates into political bar-
gaining. The natural tendency of the planning council to adjust ambitions among existing 
institutions was legitimized by the state Hill-Burton agency, whose policies for regional plan-
ning stated that, whenever feasible, existing hospitals should be expanded before new hospitals 
were built. See 2 W. MCNERNEY, supra note 50, at 1376. 
67. Interestingly, the Michigan Hospital Service did not identify these measures as cost 
containment in its 1961 report to the Commissioner. See 1961 MHS REPORT TO THE COMMR., 
supra note 56. 
68. See JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH SERVICE, AREAWIDE PLANNING FOR HOSPITALS AND RELATED HEALTH FACILITIES 
29 (1961). This report, which followed the 1959 conferences on regional planning sponsored 
jointly by the AHA and the PHS, became the single most influential document in the subse-
quent development of health planning. 
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be expensive; it was clear that successful regional planning would 
actually contribute to rising costs by raising both the quality and the 
amount of services consumed. Any "cost savings" attributable to re-
gional planning would be due to the avoidance of "unnecessary" 
costs within an increasingly costly system. 
In practice the Blue Cross standards for participating hospitals 
ensured that Blue Cross resources would flow exclusively into the 
larger voluntary hospitals, which would divide patients and markets 
among themselves through regional planning. Responsibility for de-
termining community "need" under the Blue Cross standards was 
transferred to the Greater Detroit Area Hospital Council, 69 whose 
leadership was thoroughly committed to the program. The Council 
and the Blue Cross became the managers for what economists would 
describe as a cost-enhancing and quality-maintaining cartel. 
This cartel formed in response to an economic threat peculiar to 
the hospital industry. Most industries that seek regulation do so in 
order to limit production in the face of excess capacity or to raise 
product standards in order to eliminate low-cost competitors. The 
hospital industry, however, was not suffering from excess capacity, 
and the smaller hospitals were not endangering the market shares of 
the larger hospitals.70 The hospitals' problem was that the total 
amount of resources flowing into the industry was subject to political 
limitation. That amount could level off or even fall should state in-
surance commissioners become unwilling to approve frequent Blue 
Cross rate increases or the public lose trust in the ability of the vol-
untary hospitals to deliver high-quality care at a cost that was, all 
things considered, reasonable. Moreover, if hospital costs appeared 
to be both uncontrollable and unjustified, the government might 
seek direct control either by regulation or by subsidy in the form of 
government health insurance. 
69. The Detroit area hospital council had originally'been composed entirely of hospital 
representatives, and had been called the Detroit District Hospital Council. In 1956, largely in 
response to the need to plan for suburban hospital development, the council had transformed 
itself into a community-based council renamed the Greater Detroit Area Hospital Council. 
See 2 W. MCNERNEY, supra note 50, at 1252, 1255. 
70. The occupancy rates of the large hospitals were not falling as the small hospitals prolif-
erated during the 1950s. The University of Michigan study team reported that the average 
occupancy rate for all nonfederal short-term general hospitals in the Southeastern Lower 
Michigan area (which includes Detroit) was 82 percent. The average occupancy rate in all 
hospitals over 250 beds was 84 percent; hospitals under 50 beds averaged 69 percent and those 
between 50 and 99 beds 76 percent. See 2 W. MCNERNEY, supra note 50, at 732. The low 
occupancy rates of the smaller hospitals were used as evidence that they were inefficient and 
should be eliminated. The fact that all hospital beds were not filled at all times does not 
indicate a lack of effective demand for hospital services. See discussion of Roemer's Law in 
Appendix II infra. 
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Blue Cross rate requests in the middle and late 1950s reopened 
the question whether the Blue Cross represented the interests of its 
own subscribers or whether it was bound completely to the hospital 
interest. Furor over the 1955 Michigan Blue Cross request for a 
twenty-five percent rate increase led Governor Williams to appoint a 
blue-ribbon investigatory commission; there was discussion of re-
shaping the Blue Cross Board of Directors to provide for more pub-
lic control.71 Blue Cross was particularly vulnerable to public 
outrage because it was the creature of state enabling legislation. If 
the public lost faith in the al;>ility or the willingness of the Blue Cross 
to represent the public interest vis-a-vis the hospitals, the legislature 
might simply revise the enabling statute to change the composition 
of the Board of Directors or to allow the government to set reim-
bursement policy. 
The Blue Cross-GDAHC program of eliminating the small hos-
pitals and instituting controls over construction was meant to ward 
off government action by demonstrating voluntary collective self-dis-
cipline. The hospitals did not concede, however, that rising costs 
were the principal problem. The Blue Cross, the voluntary hospitals, 
and the public health establishment all believed that the real prob-
lem was that the public did not understand why hospital costs were 
rising and therefore did not trust the Blue Cross. The issue was legit-
imacy, not cost, and the hospital-Blue Cross response was designed 
to resurrect their legitimacy. 72 
The challenge was to gain public acceptance of rising health care 
costs. The voluntary hospital and public health establishments were 
11. See 0. ANDERSON, THE UNEASY EQUILIBRIUM 167 (1968). 
The Governor's Study Commission on Prepaid Hospital and Medical Care Plans (the 
Bowles Commission) engaged the University of Michigan study team, headed by Walter J. 
McNerney, director of the hospital and health administration program at the University of 
Michigan School of Business Administration, to conduct what turned into a six-year study of 
hospital economics. See W. MCNERNEY, supra note 50. The McNerney Report was used 
nationwide by the hospitals to explain the relationship between rising costs and quality. Mc-
Nerney himself was a member of the AHA Council on Research and Education, and in 1961 
became the executive director of the national Blue Cross Association. 
72. In referring to the Blue Cross and the hospitals, we use the term "legitimacy" to mean 
any of the following depending on the context: (1) an absence of widespread political demand 
on the part of the middle classes for government health insurance, indicating satisfaction with 
voluntary health insurance; (2) public willingness to support the values of the elite hospital 
establishment against the leveling tendencies of government programs; (3) absence of political 
controversy over the performance of the Blue Cross and the hospitals or disquiet over their 
relationship; or ( 4) public acceptance of the decisions of the elite voluntary hospitals and the 
Blue Cross regarding the quality and organization of medical services. 
In discussing certificate-of-need legislation with persons who participated in its develop-
ment in New York, the authors were told several times that the purpose of CON was to restore 
the "legitimacy" of the Blue Cross. Dr. Ray Trussell told us that the reason why the Blue 
Cross could not institute controls over hospital construction was that the organization lacked 
"legitimacy." 
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persuaded that the public in fact desired high-quality hospital facili-
ties and was willing to pay for them. Officials believed that if the 
public understood that recurrent Blue Cross rate increases were the 
result of the steadily increasing complexity and sophistication of 
medical services, there would be little public opposition. If the pub-
lic believed that the voluntary hospitals were all of high quality and 
were managed efficiently it would understand that expensive hospi-
tal care still represented good value; if the public believed that the 
hospitals could discipline themselves through regional planning it 
would not call for government intervention. 73 Eliminating the small 
hospitals was explained by the need to ensure uniform high quality 
and efficient utilization of a regionalized hospital system;74 planning 
was to be a demonstration of the , hospitals' willingness to 
subordinate their individual inter~sts to the good of the community. 
Above all, the hospitals and the Blue Cross wanted to divert pub-
lic attention from the issue of cost. They wanted the public to focus 
on the shape of the hospital system viewed as a whole, to participate 
in its design, and to share in the decisions that, given the public's 
appetite for quality medical care, would drive costs irresistibly up-
ward. If regional planning had the participation of community lead-
ers and therefore their imprimatur, the community would then be 
prepared to assume responsibility for the costs that followed from 
planning decisions. Public participation in the voluntary hospitals' 
own system of self-governance would simultaneously satisfy the 
public's need to believe that hospital planning decisions were being 
made in the public interest and end the clamor for government ac-
tion. 
73. Michigan Blue Cross has repeatedly demonstrated that it can exist under reasonable 
controls and that, unlike many other agencies purporting to operate in the public interest, 
it can even flourish under self-controls that are planned and executed mutually with the 
community hospitals. This has been demonstrated even though there is no immediate 
prospect that the cost of health care in this country, or in this state, is going to level off or 
decrease. The structure of Blue Cross, with its roots in the local community and the com-
munity hospital, offers an effective and democratic system for keeping the cost of health 
care balanced properly with the rest of the economy. 
1961 MHS REPORT TO THE COMMR., supra note 56, at 7. 
74. The public needed to be persuaded that rising hospital costs were justified by the rising 
quality of service as measured by elite standards of medical practice; the small hospitals did 
not represent those standards and did not share the values of the hospital establishment, which 
was based in the large hospitals. The smaller hospitals had fewer specialists on their staffs, 
delivered fewer services per bed and generally did not use the full range of techniques of 
hospital administration that had been adopted by the hospital establishment as standard indi-
cia of quality. They also lagged behind the large hospitals in the introduction of new technol-
ogy. See L. RUSSELL, TECHNOLOGY IN HOSPITALS 71-98 (1979). Their presence in the 
hospital system would therefore make it difficult for the Blue Cross to justify its rising rates. 
The presence of small hospitals in large urban areas was also theoretically inconsistent with 
the tiered regional hospital model, which called for centralization of hospital resources wher-
ever larger institutions were economically feasible. 
246 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:203 
Controversy over Blue Cross rate increases was also erupting in 
other states with large Blue Cross plans. Insurance commissioners in 
Maryland, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and New York 
were becoming restive as Blue Cross plans barraged them with re-
quests for rate increases.75 In 1958 the Pennsylvania Insurance 
Commissioner denied rate increases for three Pennsylvania Blue 
Cross plans. He found that Blue Cross benefits had been abused by 
unnecessary utilization of hospital services in the form of unjustified 
admissions and protracted hospital stays. He further accused the 
hospitals of doing very little to bring about efficient and economical 
management. The Commissioner's decision rested, however, on the 
more dangerous premise that the Blue Cross was tied too closely to 
the hospitals and could not protect its subscribers' interests without 
assistance from the government. His order required the Blue Cross 
to develop utilization controls and other management improvement 
techniques; hospitals were required to adopt these measures or face 
the Commissioner's disapproval of their Blue Cross reimbursement 
contracts.76 
The Pennsylvania decision threatened to force the Blue Cross 
into a collaboration with the insurance commissioner to contain 
costs and to oversee the management of the hospital system. If the 
decision were to be replicated widely, the Blue Cross would become 
virtually an arm of the government. It now became urgent for the 
voluntary hospitals and the Blue Cross to regain public confidence: 
these doubts about the ability of the Blue Cross to protect the pub-
lic's interest in affordable health insurance were arising just as the 
aged were turning to the federal government for assistance in coping 
with the rising cost of health care77 and therefore reviving the na-
75. See 0. ANDERSON, supra note 71, at 167-68. 
76. See Abstract of the Adjudication of Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner Francis R, 
Smith, HOSPITALS, May 16, 1958, at 101, 116-25. The order also stated that (1) future Blue 
Cross reimbursement formulas must pass through to subscribers the cost savings attributable 
to the required management improvements; (2) hospitals must fund depreciation allowances if 
they are reimbursed for depreciation expense under Blue Cross contracts; (3) Blue Cross must 
not reimburse for costs resulting from the construction of new plant or the cost of free care, 
and should adjust its share of reimbursement of the costs of maintaining nursing schools or 
carrying out medical research to reflect the services received by Blue Cross patients from such 
programs; (4) in all negotiations between Blue Cross and the hospitals, the Blue Cross negotia-
tors must be persons who lack official connection with hospital administration so that they 
represent solely the interest of Blue Cross subscribers. The Commissioner also disapproved of 
the Blue Cross practice of offering experience-based rates to employee groups in order to meet 
competition from co=ercial insurance companies. He announced his intention to disap-
prove co=ercial health insurance rates where co=ercial insurance companies were selling 
health insurance at below cost in order to obtain customers for life insurance. 
77. See J. SUNDQUIST, POLITICS AND POLICY 287-321 (1968), for an account of the political 
forces that brought about the passage of the Medicare and Medicaid programs, which provide 
federal funds for health care for the elderly and the indigent. 
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tional debate over compulsory government health insurance. 
Regional planning, which offered a solution to the threat of ex-
plosive suburban growth, also made it possible for the voluntary hos-
pitals and the Blue Cross to deflect public pressure for cost 
containment by redefining the problem. The public believed that 
hospital costs were too high; the hospitals, supported by the public 
health establishment, argued that they were, if anything, too low if 
the public wanted high-quality care and did not want to underpay 
hospital employees, who were already at the bottom of the wage 
scale.78 The public believed that hospital facilities were overutilized 
because of health insurance; the hospitals and the public health 
schools argued that overutilization was a minor problem that could 
be solved responsibly only by self-governance on the part of hospi-
tals and attending physicians whq were sensitive to the imperatives 
of good medical practice.79 
The hospital and public health establishments encouraged the 
public to criticize inefficient utilization of hospital services. Approxi-
mately twenty-six percent of the beds in the hospital system were 
vacant at any given moment. According to the voluntary hospitals, 
empty beds, not overutilization, were the problem. They argued that 
the system must be designed to prevent the building of too many 
hospital beds, that any new beds must be in larger, more efficient 
hospitals, and that the small hospitals, whose occupancy rates were 
the lowest, must be closed. 80 In essence, the argument was that if the 
hospital system would use its invested capital more intensively, it 
could eliminate unnecessary costs while maintaining the quality of 
care. The solution to the cost problem, then, was control of hospital 
construction. It would best be carried out by voluntary planning 
agencies, but if the public insisted on some government control over 
the hospital system, the proper mechanism would be hospital con-
struction licensing, known today as certificate-of-need. 
The idea of certificate-of-need was developed to provide an out-
let for public frustration over hospital costs while avoiding cost con-
trol. Dr. Ray E. Brown, the person credited with inventing CON, 
clearly stated his intentions: 
3. 
If there is to be public regulation of the voluntary hospital system, state 
franchising offers the best means of accomplishing the ends sought and 
78. See 2 W. MCNERNEY, supra note 50, at 756-821; TRUSSELL REPORT, supra note 62, at 
79. See 1 w. MCNERNEY, supra note 50, at 471-94; TRUSSELL REPORT, supra note 62, at 
226. 
80. See Brown, Let the Public Control Utilization Through Planning, HOSPITALS, Dec. 1, 
1959, at 34-39, 108-10. 
248 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:203 
does least damage to the values of the voluntary system. It is a means 
for the public to control itself by controlling the manner in which it 
builds and uses its hospitals. 
The idea of governmental control in any form is repugnant to all of 
us who are dedicated to the voluntary way of life and our voluntary 
system of hospitals. We realize the dangers of capricious actions by 
legal agencies and the ease with which political expediency can sup-
plant logic in governmental decisions. However, the right of the public 
to impose such controls is unquestioned. They are already being im-
posed increasingly by insurance commissions. 
However, those controls could wreck the voluntary hospital system 
because they control cost, and cost controls quickly and inevitably be-
come controls of quality. The public must understand that it cannot 
retain freedom of use of its hospitals and impose controls on the cost of 
its prepayment at the same time. Control through planning offers the 
public and its voluntary hospital system an alternative that best pro-
tects both.81 
A voiding cost control by inviting the government to control hos-
pital construction was not necessary in states like Michigan where 
the Blue Cross and the hospitals could undertake such a program 
using existing voluntary agencies. 82 But faced with the volatile polit-
ical environment of New York State, the Blue Cross and the hospital 
establishment turned to government licensing of hospital construc-
tion to put "teeth" into their own regional planning process. Because 
public controversy had been stimulated by the issue of hospital costs, 
however, the program had to be presented not as a way of avoiding 
cost controls but as a form of cost control. To meet this need, the 
expectation was generated that certificate-of-need regulation would 
do what it was neither designed nor intended to do (and what, given 
the premises of regional planning, it could not be expected to do): 
moderate the rising trend of hospital costs. 
V. NEW YORK AND THE CERTIFICATE-OF-NEED MYTH 
The reasoning that led the New York hospital and public health 
establishments to propose certificate-of-need legislation was set out 
in a document entitled Prepayment for Hospital Care in New York: A 
Report on the Eight Blue Cross Plans Serving New York Residents, 
81. Id. at llO. 
82. The Michigan Blue Cross offered construction controls as part of a package of actions 
designed to control costs, including ceilings on cost increases in reimbursement formulas 
geared to hospital size. See 1961 MHS REPORT TO THE COMMR., supra note 56, at 66-68; 2 w. 
MCNERNEY, supra note 50, at 976-80. The idea of using Blue Cross reimbursement formulas 
as a cost containment mechanism was expressly disapproved in the TRUSSELL REPORT, supra 
note 62, at 10. 
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known popularly as the Trussell Report. 83 The Trussell Report had 
been commissioned by the New York State Superintendent of Insur-
ance and the Commissioner of Health after they discovered that the 
testimony of the witnesses in hearings on Blue Cross requests for rate 
increases in 1958 was distinguished by conflict, confusion, and lack 
of information. The report was to consist of "an extensive review of 
the entire nonprofit prepayment movement in the State."84 
At the time the report was commissioned, it was widely believed 
that excess hospital utilization was the major cause of hospital cost 
inflation. The charge to the Trussell study team reflects that view. 
The team was asked to evaluate whether there was need of an in-
dependent regulatory body to review utilization decisions, suggesting 
that the state authorities were at least considering the possibility of 
significant intervention in the internal affairs of the hospitals. 85 
When the Trussell Report was submitted in 1960, however, the 
idea of independent utilization controls had been quietly dropped. 
Instead, the report reflected the resistance of the hospital establish-
ment to cost controls. The report did not accept cost containment as 
a legitimate foundation of public policy toward hospitals, did not 
focus on measures to reduce costs, and did not suggest that controls 
on hospital construction, which it recommended, were to be consid-
ered a method of cost control. In the introductory section of the re-
port the study team took the position that 
[r]ising costs have been accompanied by rate increases to subscrib-
ers. . . . Due to the erosion of reserves [as a result of Department of 
Insurance attempts to hold back rate increases] it becomes evident that 
Blue Cross contracts have been underpriced. The public also has been 
83. See TRUSSELL REPORT, supra note 62. 
84. Id. at 11. 
Failing to obtain appropriations from the Legislature to support the study, the Commis-
sioner oflnsurance asked each of the Blue Cross plans to contribute to the cost, which came to 
$150,000. The final report was thus a Blue Cross-financed document. 
Dr. Trussell, the leader of the study team, was a medical doctor with a degree in public 
health and Chairman of the Columbia University Department of Public Health and Adminis-
trative Medicine. The associate director of the study was Frank Van Dyke, the Blue Cross 
pioneer who had founded the Essex County hospital service plan. The various advisory com-
mittees that were associated with the project reflected faithfully the major constituencies of the 
Blue Cross: the non-profit hospitals ( only one person affiliated with proprietary hospitals ap-
pears on the committee list); the doctors (including the immediate past president, the current 
president and the president-elect of the New York State Medical Society); pre-payment plan 
executives, principally Blue Cross and Blue Shield; representatives of business and major labor 
organizations. The Trussell Report can most realistically be viewed not as an independent 
study conducted by an impartial outside agency but as an exercise in self-study and self-criti-
cism conducted from the inside. The report virtually ignores the specific questions asked by 
the Superintendent of Insurance, which, if addressed squarely, would have required a fresh 
look at the structure of the hospital industry and a reexamination of Blue Cross reimbursement 
practices. 
85. See TRUSSELL REPORT, supra note 62, at 11-12. 
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receiving care subsidized by underpaid hospital personnel. In addi-
tion, some hospitals have not been able to provide optimum services to 
the public because Blue Cross payments to them have been less than 
the cost of providing care or insufficient to permit development of new 
services. The public is the long range loser when it underpays its good 
hospitals. 86 
Most of the study team's recommendations had to do with the 
creation of provider-dominated, community-based regional hospital 
planning councils, to which all proposals for hospital construction or 
expansion were to be submitted. The report recommended that fa-
cilities not be licensed or financed by the state or reimbursed by Blue 
Cross unless they met the criteria set forth in regional master plans 
to be developed by the councils. 
The Trussell Report sought to allay any fear that it was propos-
ing that the government actually control the hospitals: 
The purpose of the foregoing recommendations is not to create gov-
ernmental control and bureaucracy but to fix responsibility on the pro-
fessions and their organizations to carry out functions locally which are 
important but only partially performed at present. . . . Paid person-
nel are . . . working in most regions for the various organizations and 
the proposal need not involve the addition of very many people in or-
86. Id. at 3. 
The Trussell Report acknowledged that the great increase in hospital costs was to be found 
in rising costs per patient day, which in turn reflected the increasing cost and quality of serv-
ices rendered, chiefly professional and technical services. Moreover, it found that the "ratio of 
employees per bed has been rising in the past decade with the growing complexity of patient 
care and is higher in the larger hospitals studied." Id. at 158. The study showed "several 
definite relationships" between the educational activities of general hospitals and their higher 
per diem costs. Id. at 59. The study concluded that 
Costs in the State as a whole go up steadily with size and (once 50 percent occupancy has 
been reached) also go up with occupancy. The costly quality differences associated with 
hospitals of greater size and occupancy help provide an explanation of this trend. What is 
evident in this study is that the complexity and quality of services rendered and functions 
performed increase as size and occupancy rise and these tend to offset any economies 
(division of labor, etc.) associated with the greater scale of operations and fuller use of 
personnel and plant. 
Id. at 159. 
Turning to the question of hospital utilization, the study found no significant differences 
between Blue Cross subscribers and patients with other means of payment reflected in utiliza• 
tion of tests and other ancillary facilities, or in length of stay. It did find, however, that "the 
average length of stay can be seen to progress with increases in size of the hospitals." Id. at 
226. It also found that "the average length of stay in proprietary hospitals is substantially less 
than that of the other types of hospitals included in this study." Id. 
Although the recommendations that deal with reimbursement formulas implicitly exclude 
the possibility of using reimbursement policy as a method of controlling costs, see TRUSSELL 
REPORT, supra note 62, at 9, the problem of cost is not overlooked completely: it is treated as a 
problem in public relations and an area for further research. The study team reported that 
"hospital costs will continue to increase and the public is entitled to know that [not, appar-
ently, whether] such costs are justifiable." Id. at 8. The study team suggested that there be a 
"coordinated regional program for the collection, analysis and interpretation of data pertain-
ing to hospital patient care and financial operations." This data to be disseminated to "inter• 
ested agencies." Id. at 8. 
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der to accomplish what can be one of the most important health pro-
grams ever to be undertaken. 87 
This recommendation became, with some minor modification during 
the legislative process, the basis of the 1964 Metcalf-McCloskey Act 
- New York's certificate-of-need law. 
The Trussell Report recommendations first came to public atten-
tion in an atmosphere of political acrimony over Blue Cross rate in:-
creases and amid calls for legislative intervention on behalf of 
ratepayers. In response to the 1958 rate request the Insurance Com-
missioner had authorized increases averaging 33.45 percent, to be-
come effective in November 1960.88 The predictably adverse effect 
of this increase on Blue Cross's relations with the public were exacer-
bated in December 1960 when the Associated Hospital Service of 
New York gave its employees salary increases and annual length-of-
service adjustments, unfortunately packaged as "Christmas bo-' 
nuses." Assemblyman Lucian F. Russo, Vice-Chairman of the Joint 
Legislative Committee, made a political issue of the bonuses and the 
rate increase, vowing his "entire energies at the next session of the 
Legislature . . . to correcting this situation which, in the last analysis 
reposes with elected public offi.cials."89 Assemblyman Russo and 
Democratic State Chairman Prendergast demanded an investigation 
of the Blue Cross by an Assembly Committee. The issue took on a 
partisan dimension: the Democrats accused the Rockefeller Admin-
istration of sacrificing the interests of working class ratepayers to 
those of the Blue Cross and the hospitals.90 Meanwhile, Senator 
George R. Metcalf had been active in placing the Trussell Report 
recommendations on the legislative agenda of the Joint Legislative 
Committee on Health Insurance Plans, which he chaired. 
It was clear to all informed parties that the Christmas bonus 
problem was a red herring: the salary increases were routine and 
Blue Cross administrative costs were modest.91 The combination of 
the rate increase and the bonus problem had called into question, 
however, the legitimacy of the Blue Cross as a public service institu-
tion, and there was considerable pressure on the legislature to inter-
vene. In response, the Blue Cross and its allies promoted 
implementation of the Trussell Report recommendations, which 
87. TRUSSELL REPORT, supra note 62, at 6. 
88. See 1961 JT. COMM. REPORT, supra note 39, at 20. 
89. Id. 
90. See N.Y. Times, Feb. l, 1961, at 37, col. 8. 
91. See 1961 JT. COMM. REPORT, supra note 39, at 23-24. 
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could satisfy the perceived need for public action while not threaten-
ing the interests of the Blue Cross or the major hospitals. 
Senator Metcalf was an early sponsor oflegislation implementing 
the major Trussell Report recommendation.92 His strategy was to 
hold regional hearings on the Blue Cross in order to reassure the 
public of the basic integrity of the Blue Cross organization and at the 
same time to press for mandatory regional planning and CON.93 He 
also advocated greater community representation on Blue Cross 
boards of directors, and he explicitly encouraged representation of 
organized labor, which both supported CON and wanted a more 
prominent voice in health affairs. 
Senator Metcalf s legislative leadership in the public sector was 
complemented in the Blue Cross-hospital arena by that of J. Douglas 
Colman, President of the Associated Hospital Service of New York, 
the single largest Blue Cross plan in the nation.94 Colman put his 
personal authority and that of the Blue Cross behind the proposition 
that CON would control hospital costs and help to stem the rise of 
Blue Cross rates. 
The Trussell Report had not made the case for CON as a solu-
tion to the hospital cost and Blue Cross rate increase problem. In-
92. Senator Metcalfs activities in developing certificate-of-need legislation were consistent 
with his pattern of promoting moderately progressive reform measures to prod the health es-
tablishment into meeting new demands for health services in order to avoid more intensive 
government action that might lead to what was then called "socialized medicine." During 
1961-1964 when he was advocating CON controls, for example, the reports of the Joint Com-
mittee on Health Insurance Plans indicate that he was working actively on government sup-
port of medical care for the aged, mandatory hospitalization insurance for employees covered 
by disability insurance, and improved services for alcoholism, drug addiction and mental ill-
ness, among other items. On several of these programs he enjoyed the collaboration of the 
Columbia University School of Public Health. 
93. The New York State Legislature does not maintain full legislative histories. Our ac-
count of the development of the CON law, popularly known as the Metcalf-McCloskey Act, is 
based on the annual reports of the Joint Legislative Committee on Health Insurance Plans for 
the years 1961-1964. See 1961 JT. COMM. REPORT, supra note 39; NEW YORK JOINT LEGIS-
LATIVE COMMITTEE, REPORT ON HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS, Legislative Doc. No. 16 (1962) 
[hereinafter cited as 1962 JT. COMM. REPORT]; NEW YORK JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE, 
REPORT ON HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS, Legislative Doc. Na. 21 (1963) (hereinafter cited as 
1963 JT. COMM. REPORT]; NEW YORK JOINT LEGISLATI,}E COMMITTEE, REPORT ON HEALTH 
INSURANCE PLANS, Legislative Doc. No. 39 (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1964 JT, COMM, RE-
PORT]. 
94. Colman had assumed the presidency of the Associated Hospital Service in April 1960. 
Prior to that time he had been vice-president and secretary of the Blue Cross Association. He 
was also an authentic Blue Cross pioneer, having served as executive secretary of the Essex 
County plan in the late 1930s, leaving it in order to found the Maryland Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield plans. His academic credentials were impressive. He had been on the faculty of Johns 
Hopkins for 16 years and had served as vice-president of the university and hospital in charge 
of its development program. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1972, at 38, col. 2. Colman chaired the 
special committee that worked out the details of CON legislation among interested parties. 
See 1962 JT. COMM. REPORT, supra note 93, at 130. 
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deed, the study team had taken the position that the rise in hospital 
costs and therefore Blue Cross rates was due principally to the high 
quality of care provided in the good hospitals. The only even mar-
ginally respectable intellectual justification for making the connec-
tion between capacity controls and Blue Cross rate increases rested 
on a misinterpretation of a theory of hospital economics known as 
Roemer's Law. Milton Roemer of the Cornell School of Hospital 
Administration had theorized that under conditions of widespread 
health insurance a population will use as many hospital beds as are 
made available to it.95 His argument quickly became identified with 
the proposition that controlling hospital construction will control 
costs. Dr. Roemer himself attempted to correct the error by pointing 
out to the Joint Committee that regulating hospital construction 
would not necessarily lead to a d:iminution in the rate of increase in 
hospital costs and might even have the opposite effect.96 Undaunted, 
Colman pressed urgently for enactment of the program, asserting au-
thoritatively that construction controls would constrain Blue Cross 
rate increases and that failure to enact CON would lead to continued 
escalation of premiums. 
The other principal institutional promoter of the legislation was 
the New York State Department of Health. The Health Depart-
ment, which was a leader in the public health establishment nation-
ally, shared the belief that regional planning and hospital 
construction controls were the appropriate regulatory response to the 
Blue Cross crisis and were desirable even apart from that crisis. As 
an arm of the state government, however, it had more complex inter-
ests. Its own organizational objective was to consolidate its control 
over all health activities, ending the role of the State Department of 
Social Welfare in licensing health facilities. Its role as friendly regu-
lator in overseeing the regional planning and CON process would 
also transfer principal responsibility for hospital cost control meas-
ures from the Insurance Commissioner to public health officials. 
The Health Department had several complementary reasons for 
95. See Appendix II for a discussion of Roemer's Law. 
96. Roemer addressed the question squarely in his testimony before the New York Joint 
Legislative Committee on Health Insurance Plans: 
Basically the rise in the cost of hospital care in the past twenty-five years ... has not been 
due to the utilization rate. The utilization rate in hospitals, in fact, in terms of days of care 
provided has been surprisingly small. Over the last thirty years, there has been a rise in 
the days of hospital care for size of _population of only about twenty percent. There has 
been a rise in the daily cost of hospital care of about 400 or 500 percent. If you worked 
out the arithmetic of this you would find that the cost to a community of the operation of 
its hospitals is higher today because the rise is roughly ninety-five percent due to the cost 
of better care and only five percent due to a rise in utilization rate. 
1962 JT. COMM. REPORT, supra note 93, at 92. 
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wanting to protect the large downtown teaching hospitals and to 
control capital formation in the suburbs. It of course desired to pro-
tect the primacy of the large teaching hospitals within the health care 
system, particularly in New York City. As an arm of the state gov-
ernment it was also concerned that the existing voluntary hospitals 
be able to maintain themselves as an important local industry em-
ploying large numbers of workers. In addition, the voluntary hospi-
tals were performing an essential public function. They were not 
ordinary business firms: if they were threatened financially the gov-
ernment would probably have to support them; if they perished, the 
government would have to perform their functions. Although it is 
accurate to observe that the voluntary hospital establishment in New 
York sought state government regulation because the Blue Cross had 
been disabled politically from performing the function of cartel 
manager, it is important to understand that the government in gen-
eral and the state health department in particular had an independ-
ent interest in supporting the cartel. All these interests converged to 
produce close cooperation between the hospitals and state public 
health officials in the campaign for regional planning and CON leg-
islation. 
Certificate-of-need legislation was enacted in New York without 
real controversy; the time that elapsed between the publication of the 
Trussell Report and the passage of the Metcalf-McCloskey Act was 
devoted principally to negotiations over the degree of government 
control of the planning process,97 over whether the denominational 
hospitals were to be evaluated separately,98 and over whether gov-
ernment (including university) hospitals were to be controlled under 
the program. These issues were all negotiated within the voluntary 
hospital and public health establishment, which included the state 
Department of Health. 
The leaders of the voluntary hospitals, the public health estab-
lishment, and the Blue Cross all wanted to see the CON program 
enacted. They obviously lacked incentives to point out to the legisla-
ture the error of assuming that CON would control costs. Even Roe-
mer, who clearly understood that CON was not cost control, 
97. Dr. Herman E. Hilleboe, New York State Co=issioner of Health, took an active part 
in shaping the Trussel/ Report recommendations and CON legislation. Dr. Hilleboe later 
joined the faculty of Columbia University School of Public Health and Administrative 
Medicine. The authors wish to thank Dr. Andrew C. Fleck of the New York State Department 
of Health for providing insight into the governmental interest in CON. 
98. The Catholic hospitals wanted the hospital needs of religious denominations to be 
evaluated separately from the general co=unity need; such a provision, although opposed by 
other parties, was incorporated in the legislation. See 1964 JT. COMM. REPORT, supra note 93, 
at 86. 
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supported it as a first step toward government control over hospitals. 
Senator Metcalf was bent primarily on reviving public trust in the 
Blue Cross and the voluntary hospital system, not on containing hos-
pital costs; regional planning and CON were consonant with his 
objectives and were politically feasible as well. He had no reason to 
cast doubt on the program that he was sponsoring. That CON 
would not control costs could have been deduced, however, by any-
one who cared to apply elementary economic analysis to the hospi-
tals. That CON was not attacked as being inadequate to control 
costs suggests that even the most severe critics of the hospitals and 
the Blue Cross were not committed single-mindedly to cost contain-
ment. 
In New York as elsewhere, it was organized labor that objected 
most strongly to rising Blue Cross rates. The unions were ambiva-
lent adversaries of the hospital establishment. In the end, however, 
they generally supported hospital planning and CON. The reason 
lies in the apparent relationship, between quality and cost, insisted 
upon by the hospitals. The unions were interested in holding down 
the cost of care, but they were also concerned with the quality of care 
their members received. Planning and CON promised to produce 
high quality care at the lowest achievable cost; the unions would 
have been reluctant to press for actual cost containment if it might 
threaten the quality of care.99 
While there was no clear constituency for government regulation 
of hospital costs, the idea of government control over the construc-
tion of health care facilities appealed both to those who desired to 
protect or oversee the existing voluntary hospitals and to those who 
were disturbed by the growth of proprietary health care facilities. 
The clearest targets of CON regulations were the small hospitals lo-
cated in the suburbs, many of which were proprietary. While propri-
etary hospitals in New York City could not be built without the 
permission of the New York City Commissioner of Hospitals, there 
was no equivalent local regulation in Nassau or Suffolk County. 100 
99. In New York the most vocal union was the Teamsters, who threatened to set up their 
own system of hospitals. They were dissuaded from this plan after they were given a short 
course in the complexities of health care delivery. The course was arranged by Douglas Col-
man and Kenneth B. Babcock, director of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. 
100. The problem of the proprietaries was localized in the Greater New York area: while 
only one other Blue Cross plan had as many as two proprietary hospitals within its service 
area, the New York City plan had 53. New York's Blue Cross enabling legislation, unlike 
Michigan's, did not bar proprietary hospitals from participating status. There were 72 hospi-
tals with fewer than 100 beds that held participating status in the New York City Blue Cross, 
of which 32 were proprietary; and 58 hospitals with between 100 and 200 beds, of which 21 
were proprietary. See TRUSSELL REPORT, supra note 62, at 265. Nearly all of the smallest 
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Construction of voluntary hospitals had lagged behind population 
growth in these areas: capital formation for voluntary hospitals, par-
ticularly large ones, requires community-wide solicitations for funds 
based on perceived need. By contrast, a corporation or a group of 
individual physicians can raise enough capital to build a simple fa-
cility with fewer than 100 beds. Proprietary hospitals in the suburbs 
threatened to satisfy the burgeoning demand for services, potentially 
frustrating the orderly development of a regionalized system of non-
profit hospitals. 
As we have seen, the public health and hospital establishments 
were hostile to all small hospitals, whether nonprofit or proprietary. 
In addition, they were hostile to proprietary hospitals of any size. In 
New York, many of the smallest hospitals were proprietary, giving 
the proponents of CON an opportunity to focus legislators' attention 
on their for-profit status, which, in a world of health care dominated 
by nonprofit community-based organizations, made them disreputa-
ble. 
The problem of controlling the proprietaries was the dominant 
theme of the deliberations on CON legislation from the first Joint 
Committee meeting on the Trussell Report in January 1961 right 
down through passage of the Metcalf-McCloskey Act in April 1964. 
In that first meeting Dr. Trussell inaugurated the strategy of linking 
the existence of proprietaries to the problem of rising Blue Cross 
rates. 
There seem to be legal problems in controlling proprietary hospi-
tals which are apparently conceived as extensions of the doctor's office 
and therefore not subject to limitation. New York City's Blue Cross 
plan is concerned at the number of proprietary hospitals being built in 
Nassau County. Five are presently under construction or being pro-
moted. All are outside the City limits. There seems to be no liaison 
between the Department of Social Welfare and Blue Cross on this mat-
ter. Yet Blue Cross absorbs the burden of reimbursing these hospitals 
hospitals, most of which were proprietaries, were unaccredited by the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals. 
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) had been formed in 1951, 
financed by the American Hospital Association, American Medical Association, American 
College of Surgeons, American College of Physicians, and the Canadian Medical Association 
(which withdrew in 1958 to form a separate national program). The JCAH standards princi-
pally concern the administrative organization of the hospital and the provision of certain serv-
ices; they govern condition of the physical plant, governing board responsibilities, and 
essential services. Complying with these standards is relatively expensive and raises the 
amount of administrative effort required for the management of a hospital. The standards are 
based on administrative practices established by larger institutions, and it was rare by 1958 to 
find a large hospital that was not either accredited or on the verge of becoming accredited. 
The incidence of accreditation fell with declining hospital size. See 2 W. MCNERNEY, supra 
note 50, at 809; TRUSSELL REPORT, supra note 62, at 265. 
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and must ask the community for rate increases which are at least par-
tially necessary because of this increase in the number of hospital 
beds. 101 
Stressing the impact of the proprietaries on Blue Cross rates rein-
forced the legislators' own unease with an unregulated environment. 
Senator Thaler, for example, had clear views on the subject of 
proprietaries: 
As a member of this [joint] committee I have frequently heard accusa-
tions against proprietary hospitals specifically, in regard to unnecessary 
operations, overutilization, etc. This is entirely apart from the fact that 
many of them constitute, by their method of operation, a serious eco-
nomic problem for the voluntary and governmental hospitals. We 
have, in the New York City area, a scandal of the greatest propor-
tions.102 
The fact that so many of the smaller hospitals were unaccredited 
or proprietary or both made it possible for political concern over 
rising Blue Cross rates103 and general public anxiety over the quality 
of care in proprietary facilities 104 to be fused into support for a single 
program that could be described as control of the proprietaries. The 
small hospitals' objections lacked credibility: they had no alternative 
solution to the cost problem; as proprietaries many of them were tar-
nished with the profit motive; and they were opposing a coherent, 
comprehensive idea of regionalization that was supported by all of 
the respectable institutions that dealt with health care matters. 
The principal contemporary justification for CON, however, as 
articulated by its sponsors, was that it would control hospital costs. 
Attacking the proprietaries on the basis of both cost and quality 
helped to focus political support for the CON legislation. Senator 
Metcalfs press release announcing introduction of the 1964 bill that 
became the Metcalf-McCloskey Act described the program as being 
urgently sought by Blue Cross plans throughout the State because of 
their responsibility as wholesale purchasers of hospital care for their 
subscribers. 
Hospital authorities - including Senator Metcalf - are concerned 
that unless the minimal control over new bed construction such as that 
outlined for New York State in his bill becomes effective, the cost of 
hospital care may rise beyond the ability of many patients to afford 
it. . . . They feel, too, that Blue Cross premium rate raises, probably 
101. 1961 JT. COMM. REPORT, supra note 39, at 50. 
102. 1964 JT. COMM. REPORT, supra note 93, at 73. 
103. See TRUSSELL REPORT, supra note 62, at 262 (in New York City, proprietary unac-
credited hospitals received 12 per cent of the total annual Blue Cross payments). 
104. See 1962 JT. COMM. REPORT, supra note 93, at 108-10. The Associated Hospital Serv-
ice had begun to deny participating status to unaccredited hospitals in 1960. 
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necessary soon in some areas because of increased hospital costs al-
ready in effect, may have to be so sharp as to threaten the structure of 
this non-profit community mechanism. 105 
The clear implication was that if the bill were passed costs and Blue 
Cross rates would not rise so sharply. 
The Metcalf-McCloskey Act was passed in 1964, setting the legis-
lative model for certificate-of-need statutes. Its pattern of relation-
ships between state government and voluntary regional planning 
agencies has been copied widely. 106 Immediately after passage of the 
Metcalf-McCloskey Act, Governor Rockefeller appointed another 
study commission (the Folsom Committee), which recommended 
consolidating state control over health facilities construction in the 
Health Department. 107 
EPILOGUE 
The development of New York's certificate-of-need legislation 
spanned the period from the beginning of the joint AHA-USPHS 
promotion of areawide planning to the advent of Medicare and 
Medicaid. In 1958, when the Trussell Report was commissioned, the 
idea of government regulation of hospital construction as an alterna-
tive to cost containment had only just been advanced; by the time 
the Folsom Committee issued its final report in 1965 there was gen-
eral agreement within the hospital and public health establishments 
that growing government supervision of hospitals, which was inevi-
table, should be channeled through areawide planning agencies that 
would function as part of the voluntary hospital system. In 1961 the 
105. 1964 JT. COMM. REPORT, supra note 93, at 99-100. 
106. The act was modified slightly in 1965 by Article 28 of the New York Public Health 
Law,.which was enacted on the basis of the preliminary report of the Folsom Committee. See 
note 107 i,!fra. The two acts taken together required all hospital and nursing home construc-
tion (including renovation) to be approved by the State Health Department (except in New 
York City, where the New York Commissioner of Hospitals exercised the licensing function). 
The acts created a State Hospital Review and Planning Council with 31 members appointed 
by the Governor, of which not more than 15 could be health care providers, defined as physi-
cians or employees of hospitals or nursing homes. The Council advised the licensing agencies. 
The principal responsibility for planning, however, lay with the regional councils, which were 
community-based, nongovernmental agencies. These agencies reviewed plans in the first in-
stance and recommended approval or disapproval. The licensing agency then determined 
whether there was public need for the construction. See N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW Art. 28, 
§ 2802 (McKinney), 1965 N.Y. Laws Ch. 795; 1964 N.Y. Laws Ch. 730. 
107. See STATE OF NEW YORK GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON HOSPITAL COSTS, REPORT 
86-88 (1965). The committee was chaired by Marion B. Folsom, the former Secretary of 
HEW, who was closely associated with the Rochester Regional Planning Council. The execu-
tive director of the study team was made available to the committee by the Columbia Univer-
sity School of Public Health and Administrative Medicine. The list of contributors to the 
report substantially replicates the list of persons who were active in shaping the Metcalf-Mc-
Closkey Act. See id. at ii. 
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United States Public Health Service began disbursing grants to area-
wide planning groups under the Community Health Services and 
Facilities Act of 1961.108 In 1964 the Hill-Harris109 amendments to 
the Hill-Burton Act provided additional funds for planning and ena-
bled the USPHS to fund new planning agencies. 
The New York certificate-of-need law operated largely as in-
tended throughout the late 1960s. The net result of the program was 
to reduce the rate of increase in the number of hospital beds in met-
ropolitan areas, particularly in the suburbs, and to accelerate the 
trend toward fewer but larger and more capital-intensive hospi-
tals.110 Most importantly, perhaps, the New York experience with 
CON demonstrated to the national hospital establishment that the 
friendly regulatory scheme envisioned by the leaders of the hospital 
and public health establishments could in fact operate to reinforce 
voluntary planning controls without compromising the autonomy of 
the hospitals or jeopardizing their essential interests. This demon-
stration was helpful in the subsequent nationwide diffusion of CON 
regulation as the hospital cost inflation of the 1960s made some form 
of government regulation of hospitals inevitable. 
Passage of federal Medicare and Medicaid legislation in 1965 
was a watershed in the developing relationship between government 
and the hospitals. Suddenly the market for health services became 
flooded with elderly and poor patients. Hospital costs skyrocketed. 
Superficially, the cost crisis of the late 1960s could be regarded as a 
more intense version of the problems of the late 1950s, which like-
wise had stemmed from an inflationary demand for hospital services 
stimulated by third-party payment. In the 1950s government had 
been a bystander in what was principally a private sector problem, 
taking the position that voluntary sector self-discipline was prefera-
ble to government intervention. Medicare and Medicaid had 
brought on a near-crisis in public finance, however, as governments 
at all levels watched their treasuries empty due to required reim-
bursement payments to health care providers. Government now had 
the need and the desire to act, driven by its own self-interest as a 
major purchaser of medical services. Like the Blue Cross in the late 
108. Community Health Services and Facilities Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-395, 75 Stat. 
824 (1961) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
109. Hospital and Medical Facilities Amendment of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-443, 78 Stat. 447 
(1964). 
110. See generally E. ROTHENBERG, REGULATION AND EXPANSION OF HEALTH FACILITIES 
(1976). 
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1950s its principal interest was in containing its own financial liabili-
ties. 
In the late 1960s, areawide planning and hospital construction 
controls were ascendant among health care experts of nearly all per-
suasions in both the public and the private sectors; the idea that 
planning could control costs was an article of faith even though evi-
dence to support the belief was at best anecdotal. 111 With the new 
infusion of public resources into health care it seemed plausible that 
hospitals would indulge in unjustifiable duplication of equipment, 
facilities and services if they were not restrained from doing so; plan-
ning seemed to be the answer. Moreover, as the health care system 
had grown, so had perceptions of gaps in service, overutilization of 
expensive acute inpatient facilities, undersupply of out-patient and 
chronic care facilities, underemphasis on preventive care, and other 
mismatches between resources and needs. Areawide planning was 
touted as a method of creating a total health care system that would 
deliver services efficiently and thereby conserve resources. 
The federal government took an active role in promoting the pas-
sage of state planning and CON legislation. By the mid-1960s the 
federal government had created a great number of health-oriented 
categorical grant programs, many of which provided federal funds 
directly to local governments and private organizations. State health 
officials complained of the proliferation of these narrow programs 
that bypassed state authority. In response, the Johnson Administra-
tion proposed to consolidate the grant programs into a single block 
grant that would enhance the health planning capabilities of state 
governments and encourage comprehensive health planning at re-
gional or local levels. This approach was embodied in the Compre-
hensive Health Planning Act of 1966.112 
It was clear when the 1966 act was passed that the state and re-
gional health planning agencies were expected to disseminate the 
AHA-USPHS concepts of areawide planning and controls over 
health facilities construction. The regional agencies established 
under the act were modeled on existing voluntary hospital planning 
councils. They were required to have a fifty-one percent nonpro-
vider majority, thus ensuring their base in the community; and they 
were to obtain half of their funding from local sources. In most cases 
111. The anecdotes were not supported by the evidence. May found in his 1967 study that 
the rate of increase in hospital costs per patient day in areas with planning agencies was higher 
than in areas without planning. J. MAY, supra note 44, at 71-72. 
112. Comprehensive Health Planning and Public Health Services Amendments of 1966, 
Pub. L. No. 89-749, 80 Stat. 1180 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 246 (1976)). 
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the agencies obtained their local funds from hospital associations, 
medical societies, health and welfare councils, and other private or-
ganizations whose activities they were charged with coordinating. 
The planning agencies were typically created as private nonprofit 
corporations. They derived no regulatory authority from federal law 
and, prior to the enactment of state CON legislation, typically had 
none from the states. 
Beginning in 1967 the federal government began to encourage 
states to use these agencies to regulate hospital construction. In that 
year it submitted legislation that would allow it to enter into agree-
ments with states under which the federal government would with-
hold Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement for the capital expenses 
of any health care facility that had not been approved by a desig-
nated state or regional planning agency. This provision was finally 
enacted in 1972 as section 1122 of the Social Security Act. 113 State 
participation in this program was voluntary. 
Experience with the comprehensive health planning agencies 
demonstrated the obvious: they were subject to provider domina-
tion, lacked authority to carry out their regulatory role, and lacked 
the intellectual tools necessary to carry out even a planning func-
tion.114 In order to make these agencies more effective the Congress 
passed the National Health Planning and Resources Development 
Act of 1974.115 The act required the states to enact CON legislation 
on pain of losing certain federal grants, broadened the powers and 
responsibilities of the regional planning agencies, renamed them 
Health Systems Agencies (HSAs), and provided federal funding for 
them. Nearly half of the states had enacted CON legislation by 
1974, and the rest fell quickly into line. 116 
Cost control was not the only object of all this activity, but it was 
clearly a principal motivation. The problem was that CON did not 
control costs, a fact that was belatedly called to general public atten-
tion in the mid-1970s when economists began to do regression analy-
ses on health care costs in states with and states without CON 
113. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 221, 86 Stat. 1329 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § l320a-l (1976)). 
114. For some representative expressions of discouragement with comprehensive planning 
agencies, see Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by "Cert[licate-of-Need'', 
59 VA. L. REV. 1143 (1973); Luft & Frisvold, .Decisionmaking in Regional Health Planning 
Agencies, 4 J. HEALTH POL., POLY. & L. 250 (1979); West & Stevens, Comparative Analysis of 
Community Health Planning: Transitionftom CHPs to HSAs, l J. HEALTH PoL., POLY. & L. 
173 (1976). 
115. National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 300k-300t (1976), Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1974). 
116. CON legislation is currently in effect in forty-nine states. Letter from Ronald R. Bry-
ant to Rhoda Powsner (Mar. 23, 1981) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
262 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:203 
regulation. In some states early CON had no effect on the pattern of 
rising health costs. In oth.ers, particularly where the jurisdiction of 
CON regulation was limited to facilities construction and did not 
include services, CON seemed actually to exacerbate the trend to-
ward rising costs and concentration in the hospital industry. 117 
Other economists discovered that the hospital industry seemed to be 
more concentrated in localities in which regional planning was tak-
ing place, 118 and that CON was adopted most quickly by those states 
in which hospital industry concentration was the highest. 119 None of 
this should have come as any great surprise: the cost implications of 
centralizing health care around the large, full-service general hospi-
tal had been clear from the beginning. 
We express no ultimate judgment on these developments. They 
are the result of an era when large institutions were thought to be 
superior to small ones, when technological sophistication was 
thought to be the measure of quality in medical care, when the na-
tion thought of itself as a land of unlimited resources. The present 
hospital system is a creation and reflection of the postwar culture 
that created it. Many of the values and institutions of that culture 
are now undergoing reexamination in the light of changing eco-
nomic circumstances and the consequences of the public policies de-
veloped during those years. The current controversy over the role of 
competition in health care and the desirability of devoting major 
public resources to the treatment of disease as distinct from the pro-
motion of health are reflections of a changing public policy environ-
ment. The purpose of this Article has been to off er a clear account of 
the ideas, policies and institutions that created the present hospital 
system. 
APPENDIX I: A NOTE ON VOLUNTARY SECTOR REGULATION 
The development of hospital regulation through certifi.cate-of-
need closely resembles a phenomenon familiar to observors of regu-
lation: industries frequently seek government regulation to prevent 
entry by potential competitors, to raise standards, and to place a 
floor under prices. Hospital planning agencies can be analogized to 
other regulatory agencies-for example, public service commissions 
117. See E. ROTHENBERG, supra note 110, at 106; D. SALKEVER & T. BICE, HOSPITAL 
CERTIFICATE-OF-NEED CONTROLS (1979); Sloan & Steinwald, Effects of Regulation on Hosp/la/ 
Costs and Input Use, 23 J. L. & EcoN. 81, 101-03 (1980). 
118. See J. MAY, supra note 44. 
119. See W. WENDLING, J. WERNER & N. BUDDE, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF HOSP!· 
TALS: AN EMPIRICAL TEST (1978). 
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and professional licensing boards-that characteristically develop 
close relationships with the industries and occupations that they reg-
ulate. The metaphor of "capture" has often been used to describe 
the process by which government regulatory agencies come to share 
the interests and viewpoints of the regulated industries. Where the 
regulatory scheme embodies the government's conviction that the 
public interest and the private interest of the industry are compli-
mentary, however, and where the regulatory agency is explicitly 
charged with promoting the industry's interests, it is more realistic to 
think of the agency's relationship to the industry as familial. The 
more closely the agency is expected to become associated with the 
regulated group, the more realistic it is to view the agency as part of 
the industry itself, and to regard the regulatory scheme as a delega-
tion to the industry of a self-regulation function. The more the regu-
latory scheme amounts to a delegation of public authority to private 
parties, however, the more the private self-government itself must be 
anchored in fundamental democratic values if it is to achieve dura-
ble legitimacy. 
Health planning agencies lay claim to several varieties of demo-
cratic legitimacy, which helps to explain why governments at all 
levels were apparently so comfortable in creating them and in dele-
gating licensing functions to them. Most health planning agencies 
are not government agencies, but rather private non-profit corpora-
tions. But while these agencies are not government bodies, they can 
claim to be public bodies in the larger sense. 
The voluntary association is a central feature of American politi-
cal and community life. DeTocqueville applauded Americans for 
organizing themselves into private voluntary associations in order to 
perform for themselves functions that otherwise might be performed 
by government. Pluralist political theory regards voluntary organi-
zations as essential to democratic government. Hospitals are partic-
ularly striking instances of private voluntary activity that serves the 
general interest: until the advent of health insurance, the hospitals 
were charitable institutions performing the public function of caring 
for the poor. In the postwar period, voluntary hospitals, through 
their financing arm, the Blue Cross, have satisfied a public need for 
health insurance. 
The voluntary sector generally resists government control, invok-
ing the principle of limited government and challenging the idea that 
government action, particularly federal government action, is always 
to be equated with action in the public interest. Their alternative 
system of self-regulation through comprehensive community-based 
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planning agencies appeals to the mystique of face-to-face democracy 
among leaders who genuinely represent the community. With its 
broad base of active political support in the civic-minded community 
leaders who serve on hospital government boards, the voluntary hos-
pital establishment has awesome political power. Its command of 
community support and political legitimacy has contributed to the 
governments' reluctance to regulate hospital costs directly or vigor-
ously. 
The idea of voluntariness encompasses the related idea that non-
coerced action is preferable, on both moral and political grounds, to 
action that is compelled by threat. "Voluntary" action, even if it is 
taken in order to avoid potentially unpleasant consequences of inac-
tion, preserves the semblance of moral choice and autonomy on the 
part of the actor. "Voluntary" self-regulation undertaken by an in-
dustry in response to the threat of government regulation allows the 
government to capture private initiative and ingenuity in the pursuit 
of government objectives and thus to conserve government re-
sources, albeit frequently at the price of modifying the government's 
original objectives. The government has not only accepted but en-
couraged hospital self-regulation as an alternative to direct govern-
ment interference. 
In the case of hospital CON regulation, another element is at 
work as well: the government has an interest not only in curbing 
hospital construction but also in enhancing the quality of care. Gov-
ernment is much better at enforcing minimum standards than in pro-
moting excellence; it thus has tended to lend its authority to private 
voluntary organizations that have a positive commitment to collec-
tive self-improvement in functional areas-for example, education 
and health-in which government has an interest. 1 Hospital regula-
tion through mandatory regional planning and certificate-of-need 
should be viewed as an instance of cooperation between the govern-
ment of the public sector and the government of the voluntary sector. 
The voluntary government has political legitimacy, a powerful and 
loyal constituency, access to influential centers of elite opinion and 
control over some of the most important institutions in national life. 
It plans, governs, and regulates. 
l. See Finken, Reforming the Federal Relationship to Educational Accreditation, 57 N.C. L. 
REV. 379 (1979). The voluntary accreditory agencies, like systems of professional self-govern-
ance (e.g., bar associations and medical societies), derive their legitimacy from the idea that 
the profession as a whole has an interest in maintaining high standards. Although the anti-
competitive aspects of some professional rules have recently come under attack, there is not 
likely to be serious movement toward replacing professional self-government altogether with 
government regulation. 
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Hospital planning agencies are cousins to local community 
health and welfare councils, which are the private governments of 
the charitable sector in most cities. Collective action in the charita-
ble sector seems to have originated with the idea of "scientific" use 
of the charitable dollar, an idea borrowed from the English by 
American urban reformers in the 1870s. By 1895 there were nearly 
100 Charitable Organization Societies in American cities. These or-
ganizations, supported by private foundations, leaders of commerce 
and industry and the philanthropic public, served as intermediaries 
between individual needy people and the various assistance pro-
grams. By the end of the nineteenth century, the local COS was the 
acknowledged centerpiece of most cities' private charitable enter-
prises. In addition to investigating the relief needs of the poor, the 
COS would typically evaluate the relief-giving efforts of the charita-
ble agency itself. Reports evaluating the effectiveness of the most 
visible charitable agencies were circulated to potential donors and to 
public authorities in an attempt to improve what the COS perceived 
as inefficient practices. The practical effect of this activity was that 
the local COS functioned as a quasi-regulatory visiting committee 
for the charities. 
Another common example of voluntary sector planning and self-
regulation is represented by the united fundraising campaign. The 
first Community Chest was formed in Cleveland in 1913; combined 
fundraising drives became nationally significant during World War I 
when, operating as War Chests, they combined wartime patriotic ap-
peals with community welfare drives. By the end of the war more 
than 400 such organizations had been established. Joint fundraising 
necessarily entails some planning and regulatory function; the fund-
raising agency becomes a kind of guarantor to the public that the 
programs on whose behalf the appeal is made are necessary for the 
public good, and that the agencies themselves are respectable and 
professionally managed. 
Hospitals are not usually included in general community fun-
draising drives because their large capital requirements dwarf the 
requirements of other voluntary social service agencies and because 
they do not depend for their operating revenues upon community-
wide charitable solicitations. Hospital councils that have community 
representation may have close ties to the larger voluntary sector. 
The Greater Detroit Area Hospital Council, for example, derived 
two-thirds of its support from the United Foundation of Metropoli-
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tan Detroit.2 
The influential New York City voluntary hospital planning orga-
nizations are the progeny of the Hospital Saturday and Sunday As-
sociation of New York City, which was formed in 1880 as a united 
hospital fundraising drive. The Association functioned also as a 
trade association; for example, it promoted sound accounting and 
management practices and negotiated reimbursement rates with the 
City for charity patients on behalf of all the hospitals. It evolved 
into the United Hospital Fund, which continued to perform the com-
bined funtions of fundraiser and trade association and served as the 
hospitals' emissary to other federations of charitable organizations.3 
During the :financial crisis of the 1930s the United Hospital Fund 
was the vehicle through which the hospital community of New York 
adopted the two principles of voluntary prepayment and voluntary 
community planning. In 1935 the United Hospital Fund invited one 
hundred prominent citizens of the metropolitan area to sponsor the 
Hospital Survey for New York.4 The principal fact that the Survey 
had to deal with was that patients could not afford hospitalization. 
Several recommendations of the Survey were aimed at managing ex-
isting hospital capacity and constraining future growth since it had 
determined that many of the problems of the hospitals resulted from 
"lack of orderly development and of broad planning on a commu-
nity basis."5 
The Survey identified the problem as over-capacity, and recom-
mended conservative planning on a regional basis. Most intrigu-
ingly, it recommended that no new hospital construction be allowed 
to proceed without the approval of a community-based body with 
quasi-regulatory power: 
The truly colossal investment of the community in the erection and 
operation of hospitals and the complexity and essential interrelation 
among these, and between the hospitals and other institutions and 
agencies for the care of the sick, make necessary the development of 
some group, trusted alike by the contributing public and the city gov-
ernment and by the voluntary hospitals whose judgment and opinion 
would be so respected that no new hospital nor extension of existing 
ones would be undertaken without its approval. Only ... [thus] can 
the community be saved from extravagance and waste in hospital 
building and maintenance. 6 
2. See 2 w. MCNERNEY, HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL ECONOMICS 1252 (1962). 
3. See J. HIRSH, SATURDAY, SUNDAY AND EVERYDAY 11-13, 19-27 (1954). 
4. Id. at 56. 
5. Id. at 57. 
6. Id. at 58. 
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In response to this recommendation, the United Hospital Fund 
sponsored formation of the Hospital Council of Greater New York, 
which had as members seventeen community agencies and the City 
of New York. It began its work in 1938. Its purpose was 
to coordinate and improve the hospital and related services of New 
York City and to plan the economical development of these services in 
relation to community needs. It is a cooperative endeavor representing 
both community and governmental interests. Its effectiveness in the 
community will depend not on legal authority but on the competence 
of the organizations and individuals which compose it and on the con-
fidence in its judgments accorded by the public and the institutions 
affected.7 
Community planning for hospitals, therefore, was voluntary, re-
quiring the leverage of public opinion and the cooperation of private 
givers to be successful. In several other cities, private corporate and 
philanthropic sources of capital took an interest in, assuring them-
selves that the funds that they donated for hospital construction were 
to be used in accordance with real need. Beginning in the early 
1940s, following the lead of New York City, hospital or health plan-
ning agencies were launched in Columbus, Rochester, Detroit, Chi-
cago, and Pittsburgh, among other cities. These planning agencies 
were at first dominated by corporate interests who concentrated on 
minimizing the level of charitable solicitation directed toward them-
selves by constraining and spacing the amount of new hospital con-
struction. 8 With the spread of Blue Cross plans, however, which 
paid capital as well as operating costs, the hospitals no longer de-
pended primarily on industry to raise funds for building, with the 
consequence that corporate representation deteriorated to a con-
sumer interest. Gradually health care professionals became more in-
fluential in the affairs of the planning agencies; relationships were 
established with Blue Cross, insurance companies, banks, and a vari-
ety of public and private agencies. The Hospital Council of Greater 
New York was accustomed to reviewing proposals for construction 
or expansion submitted by the voluntary hospitals in the New York 
metropolitan area. 
When the leaders of the public health and hospital establish-
ments recommended regional health planning as a solution to the 
disorders of the hospital world in the late 1950s, they were proposing 
1. Id. at 61. 
8. See Gottlieb, Brief History of Health Planning in the United States, in REGULATING 
HEALTH FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION 7-15 (C. Havighurst ed. 1974). 
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to multiply institutions that were already familiar to the leaders of 
the hospital industry. If community planning with "teeth" in ac-
cordance with the traditions of the voluntary sector could deflect 
concern over rising hospital costs and restore the public's faith in the 
hospitals, there would be no need for more drastic intervention by 
the government, an intervention, that it is probably fair to conjec-
ture, no one, including government officials themselves, wished to 
force on an unwilling hospital sector unless all else had failed. 
The hospitals' desire to continue the tradition of self-governance 
through regional planning agencies coincided with increasing inter-
est in community participation and local self-determination in public 
policymaking in the 1960s. Comprehensive health planning agencies 
were viewed as opportunities for consumers, particularly members of 
medically under-served communities and other interested parties, to 
participate for the first time in what had hitherto been the closed 
arena of hospital decision-making. Unfortunately, these agencies 
were destined to become instrumentalities of hospital rather than 
community control. 
APPENDIX II: ROEMER'S LAW AND EFFICIENT HOSPITAL SIZE 
One of the intriguing questions arising out of the passage of cer-
tificate-of-need legislation is why so many people could have been 
misled into believing that CON would constrain hospital costs. Part 
of the answer lies in the Hill-Burton Act, which committed the hos-
pital planning profession to measuring the number of beds as a least 
common denominator of hospital capacity. We believe that the 
question of controlling the number of beds became confused with 
the question of controlling total hospital costs partly because of the 
advent of "Roemer's Law." 
I. 
In 1959 Milton Roemer and Max Shain of the Cornell School of 
Hospital Administration theorized that under conditions of wide-
spread insurance coverage, the supply of hospital beds in a commu-
nity or state is the major determinant of the hospital utilization rate. 1 
The observation was immediately dubbed "Roemer's Law"; virtu-
ally overnight it became a fundamental axiom of hospital economics. 
Roemer argued that new hospital beds built in a community will not 
I. See M. ROEMER & M. SHAIN, HOSPITAL UTILIZATION UNDER INSURANCE (1959); Roe-
mer & Shain, Hospital Costs Relate lo the Supply of Beds, 92 Moo. HOSPITAL, Apr. 1959, at 71. 
A later paper is Roemer, Bed Supply and Hospital Utilization: A Natural Experiment, HOSP!• 
TALS, Nov. I, 1961, at 36. 
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drain patients from existing facilities or even result in a lower aver-
age rate of occupancy across all hospitals; rather, the new beds will 
simply fill up to the same degree to which the old beds filled up. He 
observed "very little variation in hospital occupancy percentages, re-
gardless of the supply of general beds available per 1000 persons. In 
other words, hospitals in undersupplied areas are not appreciably 
more crowded with patients than hospitals in areas of high bed sup-
ply."2 Roemer's observation was quickly reduced to the axiom that 
"if a hospital bed is built it will be used." It seemed to explain the 
enigmatic but observable fact that older hospitals did not suffer de-
clines in occupancy rates when new hospitals were built. 
The implication for public policy was clear: 
if there is to be any effective control over the utilization rate, it should 
rest first of all on some sort of control over the supply of beds that are 
built and put into use . . . . Whatever the level should be, it would 
permit the community, state, or nation to finance hospital service at a 
level which it is prepared to finance - without anxieties and diatribes 
about overuse, mismanagement and waste.3 
Roemer's theory assumed the continuance of the very economic 
forces that were driving the hospital cost spiral. His "law" was an 
observation about the effect of widespread health insurance on hos-
pital utilization. He did not suggest reforming the basic structure of 
financial incentives. Most importantly, Roemer's Law was a theory 
about hospital utilization, not hospital cost. Utilization and cost are 
related but they are not the same: sparse and prudent use of a very 
expensive facility might generate as much cost as unjustified over-
utilization of a very inexpensive one. Moreover, the issue of whether 
costs or utilization should be controlled was distinct from the ques-
tion of what level of resources the society should devote to hospital 
care. Hospital costs might well rise even more steeply after a re-
gion's bed supply is controlled if the government authorizes an in-
crease in either the number of beds per capita or the intensity of 
care. The critical missing element that Roemer and Shain wished to 
supply was explicit public decisionmaking. 
Public decisionmaking, which Roemer and Shain equated with 
government decisionmaking, would deflect unjustified criticism of 
the hospitals. If the government would determine authoritatively 
how many hospital beds the population actually needed, it would 
legitimate higher costs associated with the utilization of that number 
of beds and would eliminate the public perception that high costs 
2. M. ROEMER & M. SHAIN, supra Appendix II note 1, at 13. 
3. Roemer, supra Appendix II note 1, at 41. 
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were the result of extravagance and waste caused by "overutiliza-
tion." Once having controlled the bed supply, the government could 
then determine what percentage of hospital costs it wished to subsi-
dize under compulsory health insurance, which Roemer advocated. 
Roemer supported CON, however, because he believed it would 
reassure the public that higher hospital costs, which he believed were 
both inevitable and justified, were necessary for the health of the 
community: 
The operation of a higher degree of public surveillance of public hospi-
tals could be reassuring to the public that hospitals are indeed being 
operated judiciously. Hospitals could show that their operations are 
within established standards that do not emanate from the brain of a 
single administrator or a single board, but that they come from the 
judgment of a state-wide authority. They could also enforce higher 
standards where necessary, since in the last analysis I think that lives 
are more important than dollars, even if the saving of lives means 
higher expenditures. From personal experience in the administration 
of a hospital program, I can tell you that an extensive program of pub-
lic supervision of hospitals as it has been carried out in Canada and 
elsewhere has not resulted in any reduction in hospital services, per-
sonnel or equipment, but has generally led to an expansion of services 
with improvements in quantity and quality.4 
Roemer's Law reinforced the idea of the hospital bed as the fun-
damental unit of hospital capacity. It stressed the urgency of assert-
ing public control over the number of beds in order to constrain the 
costs of hospital care. His proposal to control the number of beds, 
however, was part of a program for total government control of hos-
pitals by a combination of capacity restraints and financial subsidies. 
There was some resemblance between Roemer's desire to place a le-
gitimate lid on total expenditures and the Blue Cross's desire to limit 
its liability: both wished the public to understand and to acquiesce 
in the rising cost of health care. But Roemer wanted to create condi-
tions under which the government would determine the size of the 
health care budget, while the Blue Cross and the hospitals wanted to 
maintain their public service legitimacy precisely so that the public 
would not tum to the government for such decisions. 
There was also a critical difference in their concept of control. 
Neither the Blue Cross nor Roemer and Shain thought that hospital 
capacity limitations could be expected to reduce or stabilize hospital 
costs. Roemer and Shain advocated control by way of authoritative 
decisions made by publicly accountable government officials 
through processes that would weigh expenditures for health care 
4. 1962 JT. COMM. REPORT, supra note 93, at 95. 
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against expenditures for defense, roads and welfare. Roemer and 
Shain's preferred scenario was the hospitals' nightmare. What the 
Blue Cross and the hospitals had in mind when they used the term 
control was self-regulation through voluntary hospital planning 
councils. Government regulatory authority was to be exercised, if at 
all, only in support of decisions made by nearly autonomous re-
gional planning bodies dominated by elite providers of medical and 
social service. Funding was to continue to be provided by the Blue 
Cross and other private insurers, whose total budget would be con-
strained only by the public's ability and willingness to pay the full 
cost of care as reflected in health insurance premiums. Although 
Roemer and Shain on the one hand, and the Blue Cross and the 
voluntary hospitals on the other agreed on little else, they shared the 
view that some government-enforced limitation on hospital beds 
would legitimize the growth of the hospitals and deflect concern over 
rising costs. Roemer's Law became a plausible rationale for certifi-
cate-of-need controls even to persons who did not share the institu-
tional philosophies of the voluntary hospital establishment. 
Some economists and lawyers who have looked back at the de-
velopment of certificate-of-need legislation have asserted or assumed 
that its theoretical underpinning was Roemer's Law.5 We believe 
that the existence of Roemer's Law has diverted attention from the 
actual economic and political imperatives that led to and presently 
sustain certificate-of-need regulation. To attribute CON legislation 
to Roemer's Law is to mistake a convenient theoretical justification 
for an actual motivation. 
II. 
The difficulty with using beds as a measure of hospital capacity 
and community need is that the gross number of beds is not a surro-
gate for the quantity, quality, or type of services delivered. This 
problem was not apparent when the concept of planning the ratio of 
beds to population was first developed in the 1920s because hospital 
services were not differentiated to any significant degree. Even by 
the late 1950s the case mix as indicated by diagnostic category in 
various institutions did not vary markedly. The referral hospitals 
were using more advanced surgical and diagnostic techniques but 
the true tertiary care institution had not yet come into being. As 
hospital services became more differentiated in the 1960s, the hospi-
5. See, e.g., Bicknell & Walsh, Cert!ftcation-of-Need: the Massachusetts Experience, 292 
NEW ENGLAND J. MED., May 19, 1975, at 1054; Havighurst, supra note 114, at 1158-59; Sloan 
& Steinwald, supra note 117, at 83. 
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tal became a multiproduct institution whose capacity or output could 
not usefully be measured simply by its number of beds. Nonetheless, 
hospital planners have continued to use the bed as the standard 
measure of hospital capacity and continue to search for an optimum 
ratio of beds to population. The inherent limitations of this ap-
proach can perhaps be illustrated by a homely analogy. 
Imagine a society in which all vehicles are custom-built in work-
shops owned by supply houses that furnish parts and equipment. In-
dividual builders rent stalls in the workshops and may produce 
bicycles, motorcycles, trucks, trailers, sports cars, mobile homes, rec-
reational vehicles, hearses, fire engines, sedans or tractors. If the 
government were to begin planning industrial capacity to meet trans-
portation needs and therefore needed to decide how many work-
shops to allow to function with what number of stalls, it would 
surely not use crude demography to measure something called "soci-
ety's need for vehicles"; rather, it would ascertain the demand and 
need for the various classes of vehicles and would allocate workshop 
space, supplies and equipment in proportion to the types of vehicles 
it had decided to allow to be built. 
Hospital planning on the basis of bed capacity is the equivalent 
of transportation planning on the basis of gross stall capacity: it does 
not attempt to measure the actual need for the separate products of 
the multiproduct firm. This omission reflects the historic division of 
labor between those who supply capital and those who decide how 
facilities will be used once they are built. Hospital planning began in 
the 1920s as a service to the voluntary hospitals themselves and to 
the corporate and philanthropic interests that were the sources of 
funds for capital expenditures. During the 1920s and 1930s, when 
the services rendered in hospitals were much less sophisticated and 
differentiated than they are now, it was reasonable to speak of beds 
as the least common denominator of hospital services. Measur-
ing hospital capacity by number of beds provided a shorthand vo-
cabulary, accessible to hospital administrators, planners, and 
businesspeople accustomed to dealing in costs per square foot and 
other standard measures. The philanthropic and corporate interests 
involved in the planning process did not purport to determine the 
type of services to be rendered within the hospital; admitting physi-
cians determined whether hospitalization was necessary and decided 
what services a patient required while in the hospital. 
When the United States Public Health Service became interested 
in hospital planning during World War II, it assumed that the main 
task was to ensure that scientifically trained physicians would prac-
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tice in geographically dispersed hospital facilities to which the whole 
population might have access; the government did not purport to de-
termine what specific uses should be made of the facilities, leaving 
those decisions, in accordance with custom, to the physicians and 
hospital administrators. The objectives of the federal government 
were thus consonant with the objectives of the voluntary hospital es-
tablishment. The federal government therefore adopted the assump-
tions and methodologies of the voluntary sector and in the process of 
doing so legitimated them as public policy. The planning guidelines 
of the Hill-Burton Act, although crude, were reasonably adapted to 
their purpose, which was simply to ensure a wide distribution of hos-
pital facilities. 
The limitations of measuring hospital capacity by the number of 
beds became apparent when in the 1960s it was proposed to ration 
hospital services by curtailing the supply of hospital beds through 
certificate-of-need laws. True rationing of capacity in accordance 
with the public interest would require that someone identify the sep-
arate products of the multi product hospital firm, determine the pub-
lic need and demand for each service, determine the most 
economical means of providing each service, and so on. This task is 
simply beyond the capabilities of the hospital planners, for reasons 
that are partly intellectual, partly institutional, and partly political. 
There are no adequate measures of the efficacy of many medical pro-
cedures (e.g., heart by-pass surgery) and there is therefore no defen-
sible method of determining how many such procedures are 
"necessary"; such decisions are customarily entrusted to the clinical 
judgments of physicians. Moreover, changing tastes in medical prac-
tice mean that the service to be measured is in a state of constant 
flux. Rationing in this context is necessarily arbitrary; like other 
forms of planning that are not shaped by intellectually coherent 
standards, it has tended to deteriorate into political bargaining 
among hospitals, bargaining that has become the hallmark of certifi-
cate-of-need regulation. 
III. 
The evolving preeminence of large hospitals has shaped patterns 
of health care delivery in ways that have not been fully appreciated. 
Large hospitals have dominated the health planning process, with 
the consequence that large hospital practice has become standard 
medical practice. Regional planning increasingly permits hospital 
administrators and health planners to control the delivery of medical 
care. Most of the institutional economies claimed for the large hos-
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pitals are derived from their having a large enough patient popula-
tion to justify expensive facilities, equipment, and ancillary services. 
Once the hospital has invested in such items, its administration has 
an interest in encouraging their utilization. In addition, some of the 
ancillary services (e.g., radiology, pathology, and pharmacy) have 
been viewed as profit centers. The pressure in the large hospital is 
therefore toward intensive utilization and perhaps overutilization of 
facilities once they are in place, a dynamic made possible by the rela-
tive indifference of physicians, patients, and health insurers to cost-
benefit considerations. 6 
The hospital has always been considered a doctors' workshop, a 
model that is clearly appropriate for a small hospital. As a hospital 
becomes larger, however, hospital administrators become more in-
fluential. There is probably considerable variation among institu-
tions, even of similar size, in the degree to which hospital 
administrators can effectively control the practice of medicine within 
the institution. What is not so commonly understood is the heteroge-
neity of relationships between staff physicians and the hospital ad-
ministration within a single hospital. Hospital administrators, whose 
professional prestige is enhanced by the size, complexity, and sophis-
tication of their institutions, have a natural community of interest 
with staff physicians whose modes of practice utilize sophisticated 
technologies and justify further institutional expansion. The com-
munity of interest may be reflected in hospital administrators' alloca-
tion of resources among staff physicians, 7 in administrative decisions 
to contract out the management of particular hospital departments to 
closed groups of physicians, 8 and in decisions to close the medical 
staff or to discourage the granting of staff privileges to physicians 
whose modes of practice do not further the hospital's aspirations. 
As the hospital industry has organized itself into fewer but larger 
units, the large hospitals and their medical staffs have gained rela-
tively greater power to decide which physicians may hospitalize pa-
tients; they therefore effectively control the private practice of 
medicine, since physicians need hospital privileges in order to serve 
their patients fully. The leaders of the hospital establishment have 
identified this effect as a virtue, arguing that the large hospital's se-
lectivity protects the public against physicians who may wish to per-
6. See Feldstein, The High Cost of Hospitals-and What To JJoAbout It, Pua. INTEREST, 
Summer 1977, at 40. 
7. See Holoweiko, Why Hospitals May Be Giving Your Colleagues an Edge, MED. ECON., 
Jan. 21, 1980, at 85. 
8. See M. THOMPSON, ANTITRUST AND THE HEALTH CARE PROVIDER 149-71 (1979). 
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form procedures for which they are not qualified. The granting or 
withholding of hospital staff privileges thus serves as yet another 
level of medical licensing and certification. On the other hand, the 
physicians on the existing staff of a hospital are typically in private 
practice themselves; in determining which physicians to admit to the 
staff they are also determining which physicians will compete with 
them. 
An additional effect of capital investment in large hospital facili-
ties is rigidifying of medical practice around current patterns of 
treatment favored by the institution. The practice of medicine at the 
larger hospitals has set community expectations and medical stan-
dards; the malpractice crisis has developed as the legal negligence 
standards have followed and reinforced the evolving predominance 
of large hospital practice which, as we suggest above, has been heav-
ily influenced by the hospitals' own preferences for capital- and serv-
ice-intensive modes of treatment. 
The hospital and public health establishments justify their com-
mitment to the large hospital, as we have seen, by the number of 
services that the large hospitals can provide, the quality of care that 
is thought to be associated with large size, and the control over the 
practice of medicine that institutional centralization makes possible. 
Economic efficiency per se is rarely advanced· as a justification for 
the largest hospitals, although it is used as an argument against the 
small hospitals that cannot support a full range of services. Contem-
porary hospital economists generally agree that the optimum size for 
a general short-term hospital is in the range of 200-300 beds.9 But 
what is a short-term general hospital, and what is it supposed to pro-
duce? A hospital does not produce a product; a hospital provides a 
setting in which medical services are dispensed. The most efficient 
plant size for a hospital is the size at which medical services can be 
dispensed most efficiently. 
If maximum efficiency were the goal, then every hospital would 
be sized to accommodate the functions that must be performed 
under the same roof, and those ancillary services that have a coinci-
dent efficiency peak; other services would be provided by outside 
firms on a contract basis. The functions that must be provided to 
nearly all patients and that must be housed together for the sake of 
adequate patient care are medical beds, surgical beds, an operating 
room, a laboratory that can supply blood and other essentials, food 
9. See, e.g., P. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 177-86 (1979). 
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service, and a nursing staff. There should be an optimum plant size 
for these functions. 
Once the size of the basic unit is established, it should then be 
possible to decide which ancillary services to provide through in-
house employees and which to provide through external suppliers. 
For example, assume that a single physical therapist can provide 
service to twenty-five patients per day. If a hospital has twenty-five 
patients per day for whom the marginal benefit of physical therapy is 
equal to 1/25 of the cost of employing a physical therapist, it makes 
sense for the hospital to employ a full-time therapist. If it has only 
ten such patients and the hospital hires a therapist, one of two things 
will happen: either the therapist will render service only to those ten, 
in which case they will receive service of which the fully allocated 
cost is more than twice the marginal benefit; or the hospital will treat 
the therapist as a fixed cost and will find fifteen more patients for 
whom the marginal benefit of the service is less than 1/25 of the cost 
of the therapist - in which case the fully allocated cost is less but 
there is still economic waste of some portion of the therapist's ef-
forts.10 Although this example may seem trivial, the distinguishing 
characteristic of the large hospital is its labor-intensiveness and the 
multiplicity of its ancillary services. Economies of scale in the hospi-
tal have ordinarily been evaluated in terms of capital-intensive func-
tions (for example, surgical intensive care units); however, inefficient 
use of labor can be equally wasteful. 
A concern for efficiency in sizing hospitals might bring about a 
10. If the health care industry desired economic efficiency, it would make sense for a group 
of physical therapists to create an independent firm that could provide as much, and only as 
much, service as a hospital's patient mix actually required. This is the normal industrial 
model: an automobile manufacturer does not attempt to make all of the components that 
comprise an automobile, but rather may purchase engines, transmissions, ball bearings, and 
other parts from other firms properly sized to their tasks. That is not the pattern of the hospital 
industry; every hospital typically attempts to provide both its basic and its ancillary services in 
a single plant, with rare exceptions for industrial functions such as laundry, cleaning, and 
equipment supply. 
This commitment to the full-service, integrated hospital would not be possible, however, in 
the absence of widespread full-cost reimbursement by insurers that are relatively indifferent to 
cost considerations. Hospital administrators, who derive prestige from the size of their staffs 
and the number of ancillary services that their institutions provide, can afford to satisfy their 
own inclination to have total control over all elements of the hospital's functioning by having 
all services provided in-house. Administrator preferences are reflected in the Joint Commis-
sion on Accreditation of Hospitals standards, which further reinforce administrators' inclina-
tions to have all services performed by their own employees. 
These economic and institutional factors are reinforced by medical culture. All ancillary 
services are support for the physicians, most of whom are male; most of the ancillary 
paramedical services are specializations of nursing, which is a predominantly female profes-
sion. Splitting off functions from large, sheltering institutions and lodging them in smaller 
private businesses would require a willingness to undergo economic risk that is not common in 
the socialization of women. 
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closer relationship between the nature of the institution and the ac-
tual needs of the patients that it serves. It is well-known that the vast 
majority of the patients who require hospitalization could be treated 
adequately in relatively uncomplicated primary or secondary care 
facilities. The idea that the efficient general hospital is one with 200-
300 beds is predicated on the definition of a hospital as an inte-
grated, full-service institution with internal subsidies, some teaching 
function and an appropriate degree of specialty medicine. This self-
definition on the part of the hospital industry is reflected in the stan-
dards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. If the 
hospital industry were redesigned primarily with economic efficiency 
in mind, smaller noncentralized hospitals might be appropriate for 
most purposes; complex facilities might be centralized and sized 
properly for the number of patients who require them. Achievement 
of greater economic rationality in the hospital industry will ·require, 
however, a substantial redesign of the insurance function to elimi-
nate existing incentives for inefficient hospital size. 
